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RELATIVE DOUBT: FAMILIAL SEARCHES
OF DNA DATABASES
Erin Murphy*
The continued growth of forensic DNA databases has brought about great-
er interest in a search method known as 'familial" or "kinship" matching.
Whereas a typical database search seeks the source of a crime-scene stain
by making an exact match between a known person and the DNA sample,
familial searching instead looks for partial matches in order to find poten-
tial relatives of the source. The use of a familial DNA search to identify the
alleged "Grim Sleeper" killer in California brought national attention to
the method, which has many proponents. In contrast, this Article argues
against the practice of familial searching on a variety of grounds, includ-
ing claims related to equality, accuracy, privacy, racial discrimination,
and democratic accountability. It then addresses the legality of the method.
Lastly, in the event that arguments to prohibit the practice prove unpersua-
sive, this Article sets forth recommendations for restrictions on familial
searches that might ameliorate their possible iniquitous effects.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Denver District Attorney Mitchell Morrissey recovered DNA
profiles in three separate unsolved rape cases, but his search for matching
profiles in the national DNA database failed to return any hits.' Typically,
such a search looks for complete identity between a crime-scene sample and
a known offender using thirteen genetic markers. However, the software that
compares profiles can reveal not only exact matches, but also near-miss
matches of fewer markers. In Morrissey's case, each of the three searches
also uncovered partial matches. Because genetic information is inherited,
Morrissey conjectured that those profiles might belong to relatives of the
sources, and thereby point to the perpetrators of the offenses.
The only problem was that the matches originated in Oregon, Arizona,
and California, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), which ad-
ministers the national database, stores its information anonymously. Even
though a state can always access its own information, FBI rules forbade
states from disclosing to other states the identifying information of anyone
other than the "putative perpetrator." When Morrissey asked for an exemp-
tion, federal DNA database head Thomas Callaghan refused, citing concerns
about privacy and fairness. He worried that the searches would discredit
1. Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, Tracing a Suspect Through a Relative, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 25,
2008, at 1.




DNA databasing efforts, and stated that he "would be more comfortable
with congressional authorization to conduct familial searches."'
Frustrated, Morrissey wrote to the director of the FBI laboratories in
2006, complaining that the policy "protects murderers and rapists" and
warning that one of his "quite assertive" victims would generate a media
maelstrom. Several days later, FBI Director Robert Mueller called Morris-
sey to discuss the issue. Shortly thereafter, Director Mueller changed the
national database regulations to permit the release by states of identifying
information in the event of a partial match, defined as one allele at each lo-
cus.5 Arizona and Oregon then complied with Morrissey's request, but
California still resisted. After a campaign by the state's sheriffs and district
attorneys' organizations, however, California Attorney General Jerry Brown
agreed to release the name. Then, in April of 2008, Brown announced that
California would not only share such information, but would also set out the
first policy in the nation that explicitly authorizes intentional searches for
partial matches-also known as "familial" or "kinship" searches-in its
6DNA databank. Additional jurisdictions have since then formally an-
nounced their intention to begin conducting familial searches,' and
individual laboratories have simply conducted such searches even in the
absence of formal legal authorization or express policies.
Interestingly, often lost in recitations of Morrissey's crusade is one re-
vealing fact: his familial searches did not work. None of the three matches
turned out to point toward a relative, much less the source, of the actual
crime-scene sample.9 Also often absent from the tale is any story of what
happened in the aftermath of the searches. How many relatives were investi-
gated? How did officials rule out wrongly identified persons, or attempt to
confirm the identity of a perpetrator? Given that it failed in three separate
cases, how tailored was the partial match search?
In contrast to Morrissey's unsuccessful first venture into familial search-
ing stands the story of the apprehension of the alleged "Grim Sleeper" killer.
After California adopted its familial search policy, investigators began using
3. Id.
4. Dolan & Felch, supra note 1.
5. Bulletin, CODIS Bulletin # BT072006, Interim Plan for Release of Information in the
Event of a "Partial Match" at NDIS (July 20, 2006).
6. Information Bulletin from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, DNA Partial Match
(Crime Scene DNA Profile to Offender) Policy No. 2008-BFS-01 (2008) [hereinafter California
Policy]; Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, California Takes Lead on DNA Crime-Fighting Technique,
L.A. TtMEs, Apr. 26, 2008, at 1.
7. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, New Rule Allows Use of Partial DNA Matches, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2010, at 12 (announcing New York's change in policy, as of December 2009, to permit
kinship matches under certain circumstances).
8. See Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011); see also Natalie Ram, Interactive Map: State Policies for DNA Crime Databases
Vary Widely, Sci. PRoGREss, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/ 1/map-state-dna-
policies/print/.
9. Dolan & Felch, supra note 1.
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the technique. Ten attempts were unsuccessful, including one involving a
genetic profile that linked the slayings of at least ten women in the Los An-
geles area to one likely perpetrator, dubbed the "Grim Sleeper."'o But in
April of 2010, a second search in the case uncovered a potential match to a
recently convicted offender believed to be the Sleeper's son." After a sting
operation in which officers surreptitiously collected a piece of pizza dis-
carded by the suspect, tests revealed a match to the crime-scene samples and
the suspect was arrested.12 Unlike the Morrissey cases, the California search
apparently not only proved successful in finding an actual relative, but also
(likely as a result) produced a public record of the course of the follow-up
investigation.
The Morrissey and Grim Sleeper case studies illustrate both the promise
and the perils of familial DNA searching. On the one hand, familial searches
offer the opportunity to solve horrific crimes that have frustrated all law en-
forcement efforts; on the other hand, they can generate false starts or cast
suspicion on wholly innocent people solely on account of biological relat-
edness. This Article examines the practice, and ultimately argues against it
on both utilitarian and deontological grounds. Part I provides a brief techni-
cal background. Part II argues normatively against the method, offering six
separate arguments that reference both its practical utility and moral defen-
sibility as a law enforcement tool. Part III then addresses the legality, and in
particular the constitutionality, of the practice. And finally, in the event that
the previous Parts fail to persuade, Part IV suggests safeguards intended to
minimize the intrusiveness and discriminatory potential of such searches.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO FAMILIAL SEARCHING
A. Forensic DNA: Mechanics
A person's genome is made up of 3.2 billion nucleotides (abbreviated as
G, T, C, or A) inherited equally from one's mother and father and stored in
divided bunches on twenty-three paired chromosomes." These chromo-
somes are found in the nuclei of each of the roughly 100 trillion cells that
make up a human being.14 Genome "sequencing," or the process of unpack-
ing the genetic strand to uncover the letters and put them in order, has
10. Greg Miller, Scientists Explain How Familial DNA Testing Nabbed Alleged Serial Killer,
SCIENCE INSIDER, July 12, 2010, http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/07/scientists-
explain-how-familial.html. It is unclear whether the ten prior attempts turned up no leads at all, or
whether some turned up leads, but further investigation of those leads' relatives relieved them of
suspicion.
11. Dolan & Felch, supra note 1.
12. Miller, supra note 10.
13. JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING 17-20 (2d ed. 2005). See generally Erin Mur-
phy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Iayperson's Guide to the Subjectivity Inherent in Forensic
DNA Typing, 58 EMORY L.J. 489,495 (2008). The twenty-third chromosome pair is the sex chromo-
some-either XX for females or XY for males. Id.
14. Murphy, supra note 13, at 494-95.
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revealed that the vast majority of DNA-over 99.7 percent-is identical
between two people.' However, certain stretches of the DNA strand, called
"microsatellites," contain, a finite quantity of variability that can serve to
distinguish one individual from another.6
The most common form of forensic DNA typing in the United States,
known as "STR" or "single-tandem repeat" typing, looks to thirteen places
(or "loci") on the genomic strand and counts the number of times certain
known sequences repeat themselves." These are referred to as the "auto-
somal" loci, because the genes are spread across the twenty-two
chromosomes that are identical in both sexes, as contrasted to the "Y-STR"
loci, which reference genetic material found only on the male Y sex chro-
mosome. At each locus, analysts measure two repeat lengths, otherwise
known as "alleles"-one descended from the mother and one from the
father. By counting the repeats at thirteen loci, an analyst can obtain twenty-
six discrete measurements that help individuate one person from another.'8
Because these twenty-six alleles are directly inherited from one's
biological parents, there is a significant probability that two people who
share biological ties will also share a large number of alleles in common.
At minimum, a child and a parent will match at thirteen alleles, for in-
stance. Due to the unpredictability of inheritance (since, of course, it is
possible for one sibling to inherit one-half of a parent's twenty-six alleles
while the other inherits the other half), it is not possible to state defini-
tively how many alleles two siblings will share in common.'9 However,
one estimate suggests that siblings on average share roughly 16.7 alleles in
common. 20 Interestingly, the probability of overlap turns on several
factors-most pertinently on common inheritance, but also on the likeli-
hood that the parents themselves shared a particular allele and the
21
commonness of that allele in the population at large. Suffice it to say,
however, that it is possible to draw inferences of relatedness based on a
particular pattern or distribution of alleles in the genetic profiles of two
individuals.
In the United States, all fifty states and the federal government collect
and type biological samples, typically from convicted persons, but more
15. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 26.
16. Id. at 85-86.
17. Murphy, supra note 13, at 495.
18. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 23.
19. Identical twins will of course share all alleles in common. Id. at 26.
20. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Of-
fenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 253 (2006); see also Simon Cowen & Jim Thomson, A
likelihood ratio approach to familial searching of large DNA databases, 1 FORENSIC ScI. INT'L 643,
644 & fig. 1 (2008) (reporting on simulations of shared allele expectations in related and unrelated
populations using SGM+ loci).
21. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 253.
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recently also from arrestees.22 The material is then stored in databases at the
local, state, and national level. The Combined DNA Index System
("CODIS") is the name of software developed by the FBI to conduct
searches of genetic profiles, but it has come to stand for the idea of the na-
tional database itself-a central repository into which all states can "upload"
their profiles and then in turn search among the profiles deposited by other
jurisdictions. 23 The uploaded profiles consist solely of the numbers describ-
ing the alleles, as well as identifying information that allows the record to be
traced back to the uploading entity. The jurisdiction that enters the record
retains all of the personal information (such as the name and address) of the
individual to whom it belongs.24 Originally, there were separate rules for
what kinds of material could be uploaded nationally versus kept within a
state's own borders25-for instance, arrestee profiles were initially prohib-
ited from being placed in CODIS.26 However, a subsequent enactment
enabled the FBI to change its rules to allow states to upload any profile col-
lected in a manner consistent with the state's own laws.27
The national database has grown impressively in size since its authoriza-
tion by Congress in 1994.28 It contains several different indexes of profiles,
but most relevant to this discussion are those belonging to known persons
(often called "offender profiles") and samples of unknown origin gathered
from crime scenes (often called "crime-scene" or "forensic" profiles). 29 As
of August 2010, the national database contained over 8.7 million offender
profiles and over 332,000 forensic profiles.so Links can be made between a
crime-scene sample and a known offender (often called a "cold hit"), as well
as between two samples from the same or different crime scenes. There have
already been numerous instances of individuals convicted on the basis of a
cold hit alone.3'
22. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 721, 738 (2007).
23. Id. at 73940 & nn.74 & 79.
24. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 440.
25. Murphy, supra note 22, at 739 & nn.75 & 76.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (2000).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1) (2006) (adding to "persons convicted of crimes" also those
"charged in an indictment or information with a crime" as well as "other persons whose DNA sam-
ples are collected under applicable legal authorities"); Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
405, § 203(a)(1), 118 Stat. 2260, 2269 (2004) (altering enabling legislation).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 14131-32 (2006).
29. Murphy, supra note 22, at 738.
30. Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS Statistics Clickable Map, http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/labicodis/clickmap.htm (last visited Oct. 6,2010).
31. Yun S. Song et al., Average Probability that a "Cold Hit" in a DNA Database Search
Results in an Erroneous Attribution, 54 J. FORENSIC Sci. 22, 22-23 (2009) (citing cases where con-
victions were obtained by this method). See generally Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers?: Deciding
When DNA Alone Is Enough To Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 110 (forthcoming Oct. 2010).
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A law enforcement officer wishing to search a database has several op-
tions. First, the officer must choose which level of database to search. The
national database ("NDIS") is the most comprehensive, as it contains the
greatest number of profiles from the widest array of jurisdictions. But the
officer might also search her own state level database ("SDIS") or even a
locally maintained database ("LDIS"). Databases within a jurisdiction might
contain more local material than the national database, because the rules
about the submission's quality or its connectedness to a crime scene might
be relaxed within a state or locality.33 If a search conducted in the national
database reveals a match, then the FBI facilitates the disclosure of informa-
tion between the jurisdictions according to FBI policy. In contrast, a search
within a jurisdiction or locality that turns up a match can be dealt with ac-
cording to that jurisdiction's own rules.
The investigator must also decide how strictly to construe the match pa-
rameters. The CODIS software allows three levels of inquiry: high,
moderate, and low stringency. A high-stringency search requires identity
both in number and kind of all twenty-six of the alleles in the two samples.
A moderate-stringency search returns matches in which the profile has all
twenty-six alleles of the submission, but the submission contains additional
material as well. Such a search could be useful in the case of mixtures, when
investigators wish to pull up all profiles that contain all of the submitted
sample's alleles, while also allowing the submission to have extra alleles
likely belonging to another person. A low-stringency search returns
matches in which at least one allele is present, even though the profile has
additional alleles that the sample does not, or vice versa. 17 Typically, a
search in a DNA database is conducted on high- or moderate-stringency, and
the goal is to return an exact match. However, because lower-stringency
searches are possible, a search may also return near misses or "partial
matches."38
B. Familial Searching: Mechanics
Familial searching refers generally to the idea of looking in a DNA da-
tabase not for the person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a
relative of that individual. That is, when a database search does not turn up
32. Murphy, supra note 22, at 739 (explaining databases available at local, state, and national
levels).
33. BUTLER, supra note 13, at 441; Murphy, supra note 22, at 739 n.75. This benefit sub-
sided slightly when the federal rules adapted to allow uploading of any material collected in
compliance with state regulations.
34. Eva Steinberger & Gary Sims, Finding Criminals Through the DNA of Their Relatives-
Familial Searching of the Cahfornia Offender DNA Database, 31 PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF 28, 30
(2008).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 30-31.
37. Id. at 30.
38. Id. at 29-31.
Relative Doubt 297December 2010]1
Michigan Law Review
an exact match, it is possible to follow up with a moderate- or low-
stringency search that returns partial matches-profiles that match some, but
not all, of the sample's alleles. Studies show that, if the database does in-
deed contain a relative and the search threshold is set widely enough, it is 80
to 90 percent likely that a partial match search will include the relative in its
results. 9 But studies also show that such a search is also likely to return a
number of persons that are not in fact related to the source. The exact
number of such persons depends dramatically on the scope of the search,
which will be explored in greater depth in Section IV.D. For now, suffice it
to say that a reasonably tailored search is likely to uncover as few as one or
41as many as twenty-five persons.
Discussing familial search methods can be confusing, because the word
"relative" can refer to the person in the database, any of that person's kin
(suspected sources of the material), as well as the actual source of the mate-
rial. Thus, for purposes of clarity, it may be helpful to establish a vocabulary
regarding such searches. For purposes of this Article, the persons in the da-
tabase will be called "offenders" or "database leads," since they are the
individuals who, by possessing a databased profile that partially matches a
crime-scene sample, point toward suspects, one of whom may be the source.
Note that there will, in many cases, be multiple leads-a partial match
search by its very nature can always return more than one potential lead. Of
those many leads, multiple suspects (the relatives of those leads) may be
generated. Thus, for this Article, "suspects" refers to the relatives of those
databased persons-the individuals on whom suspicion will fall as a result
of their relatedness to the databased individual. Although in theory any rela-
tive of a lead could be considered a suspect, in reality the true suspects are
likely to be those relatives who fit the presumed profile of the criminal per-
petrator; we can imagine that investigators will in most cases rule out the
toddlers and grandmothers of the leads, for instance. Finally, I will use
"source" to identify the actual individual who left the unknown crime-scene
sample, usually considered to be the perpetrator of the offense.
Most importantly, the word "relatives" here refers only to the pool of
suspects (of which the source may be a part) generated as a result of a data-
base partial match search-that is, an undefined number of individuals
under suspicion as a result of a partial match search that identified one or
more database leads as a possible relation of the source. Accordingly, "sus-
pects" and "relatives" here are somewhat interchangeable, although we
might imagine that while "relatives" includes the entire universe of persons
39. Erin E. Murphy et al., Equality, Efficiency & Familial DNA Search Policies (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through
DNA of Their Relatives, 312 Sa. 1315, 1315-16 (2006) (estimating that roughly 80 percent of sib-
lings might be identified).
40. T.M. Reid et al., Use of sibling pairs to determine the familial searching efficiency of
forensic databases, FoRENSIc Sc. Ir.: GENEIcs 340-42 (2008).
4 1. Id.
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related to the database lead, "suspects" refers to a more narrow class of
likely perpetrators (e.g., no grandmas or toddlers).
To illustrate, imagine a homicide in which scrapings from beneath the
victim's fingernails turn up the profile of the likely perpetrator. Detectives
first run the sample in the database to find the source, but no matches are
forthcoming. Detectives then run the sample at lower stringency, and turn up
twenty-five leads, which they narrow down to a list of five based on other
factors (say, proximity to the crime scene). Detectives then investigate the
relatives of the five leads, to determine if any link to the source. Four turn
out to be clearly bad leads-investigation of their relatives reveals that none
is the source. Those relatives, then, are innocent suspects-they were sus-
pected of the crime as a result of the database lead, but have nothing to do
with the offense. Imagine that the fifth lead turns out to have two relatives,
one of whom is totally innocent (an innocent suspect), but the other of
whom proves to be the source (in this example, the perpetrator). Of course,
there may also be cases with many leads (databased offenders that partially
match the crime-scene stain) that generate many suspects (the relatives of
those offenders), and yet no source is found (because subsequent testing
excludes each of those relatives as the possible source).
Lastly, it is important to note that the number of leads generated, and
thus the number of suspected relatives investigated, will be a function of
several factors. The most direct function relates to the manner in which the
search is conducted-the technical parameters that are imposed. A search
that sets incredibly high standards for leads, by requiring a great deal of
identity between the sample and a known profile, will greatly increase the
likelihood that one of those leads pans out, but such strict parameters are
also more likely to eliminate a lead that would have pointed toward the
source. Conversely, a search that sets lower standards, and allows partial
matches with less identity, may generate a greater overall number of leads,
one of whom might be related to the source, but it will be far more difficult
to find the useful lead within this larger suspect pool. In other words, if the
search looks for matches of twenty-five alleles, then it is less likely to iden-
tify leads, but the leads identified are more likely to in fact be relatives. If
the search looks for matches of only fifteen alleles, it will return a large
number of leads, but among them is likely to be a source's databased rela-
tive. Choosing how to conduct the search is thus a trade-off: if the standard
is too high, it will inevitably cut out leads that are in fact related to the
source, but if the standard is too low, it will sweep in a larger number of
individuals who are innocent and make it more difficult to find the true
source.
This trade-off is exemplified in the manner in which partial match leads
come about, since near-miss matches can come about two ways. The first,
often called "inadvertent partial matching," occurs when investigators search
the database intending to find an exact match, but use a low- rather than
high-stringency search. In some cases, the search inadvertently turns up
matches that are closely approximate. At that point, the analyst has two
choices: she can report the partial matches to law enforcement or return a
Relative Doubt 299December 20101
Michigan Law Review
report that states that no exact matches were found. Which of those routes
the analyst takes often depends on the policy, custom, or laws of the
particular jurisdiction. Some states expressly forbid reporting in such cases,
others expressly allow it, and still others remain silent. It may also turn on
the closeness and number of the matches-if the inadvertent match is one
individual matching at twenty-three of twenty-six alleles, for instance, the
analyst may be more inclined to report it than if it is a handful of persons
matching at seventeen of twenty-six alleles.
The second method, called "intentional familial searching," is an inten-
tional search for partial match leads. In that case, the very purpose of the
search is to identify possible leads and then investigate any suspicious rela-
tives. California, in adopting its policy, became the first jurisdiction (state or
federal) to explicitly authorize intentional familial searches, although it is
not the only state that undertakes them. The California policy permits
searches, in certain circumstances, for partial matches at fifteen alleles, and
then requires an additional form of genetic typing (Y-STRs) to winnow
those leads down to a manageable number.
The next Section explores the current landscape of familial searches in
greater depth. But first, one final point is worth observing: most experts ac-
knowledge that the current iteration of the CODIS software does a poor job
of identifying true leads in familial searches. 42 Because the software was not
designed for this purpose, it fails to take into account the wide variation in
the popularity of certain allelic combinations as opposed to others. By sim-
plistic analogy, it is akin to running a computer program designed to ferret
out suspects by their names that does not differentiate between names that
have an "X" in them versus those that start with an "X." It would thus con-
sider "Alexander" as equally probable a match as "Xenia." Naturally,
advocates of intentional familial searches have moved toward the develop-
ment and deployment of more sensitive search tools, and some such tools
are already available.43 Accordingly, this Article will assume the deployment
of the best current technologies in assessing familial search practices.
42. Steinberger & Sims, supra note 34, at 31 ("Research conducted at the DOJ Richmond
DNA laboratory has shown that CODIS, in its current configuration, is a very poor tool for finding
familial relationships."). That is because "CODIS looks for allele-sharing patterns based on the level
of stringency specified in a search and does not take into account the rarity in the population of a
shared allele." Id.; see also Dolan & Felch, supra note 1 ("The FBI software was not designed to
find relatives, and a standard search accidentally eliminates more than 99.9% of relatives while
often fingering people whose profiles are similar by pure chance .... ).
43. Denver DA Mitch Morrissey has stated that he is testing software explicitly designed for
such searches. National Forensic Science Technology Center, Familial DNA Search Investigations,
http://projects.nfstc.org/postconviction/presentations/morrissey.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). It
appears that he is referring to a program known as "DNA*View," which was developed by a re-
searcher. DNA*View, http://dna-view.com/dnaview.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). Morrissey
claims that it can eliminate 90 percent of unrelated people.
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C. Current Landscape
Perhaps surprisingly, the concept of familial searching has been around
for a decade or so. In fact, the first forensic use of DNA typing was in a fa-
milial context: an immigration case in the United Kingdom used genetic
typing to "test of the truthfulness of a claim to family connectedness."" The
first familial database search, however, did not occur until 2002, when ge-
netic testing led investigators in a serial rape case from the 1970s to a profile
that turned out to be the son of the perpetrator.45 That search proceeded in a
somewhat unorthodox fashion: investigators had compiled a list of potential
suspects based on various conventional investigative methods, and one of
those listed was a man by the name of Joseph Kappen." Further investiga-
tion revealed that Kappen had since died, but a familial search of the
national database produced his son as a possible familial lead. Based on this
information, investigators received permission to exhume Joseph Kappen's
body, and subsequent testing revealed a match.47
Presently, the United Kingdom and New Zealand actively engage in fa-
milial search methods, 48 with conflicting reports on its rate of success, 49 and
other countries have similarly expressed an interest in pursuing the tech-
nique.o Canada appears to be the only country to expressly forbid the
practice, apparently on privacy grounds." The first conviction based on
44. Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness: Issues in
the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 34 J.L. MED. & ETH-
iCs 234, 242 (2006).
45. Id. at 243.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Thomas Jones, The Devil is in the Detail, GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2010, at 24. The UK
Forensic Regulator is presently undertaking a review of the practice. Carole McCartney et al., The
Future of Forensic Bioinformation, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHIcs at 86 (May 2010), available
at http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/filesresearch/ccjs/forensic-bioinformation-report.pdf.
49. See, e.g., James M. Curran & John S. Buckleton, Effectiveness of familial searches, 84
SCI. & JusT. 164, 164 (2008). One recent article cited seventy searches since 2004, eighteen of
which led to matches and thirteen to convictions. Jeffrey Rosen, Genetic Surveillance for All,
SLATE, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2213958/. Another report suggests that as of April
2008, eight cases had been solved in this way. Nakashima, supra note 2, at Al; see also Richard
Willing, DNA 'near matches' spur privacy fight, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2007, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-02-dna-N.htm (citing fifteen cases); Richard Willing,
Suspects get snared by a relative's DNA, USA TODAY, June 7, 2005, http://www.
usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-06-07-dna-cover-x.htm (citing nine solved cases); NATIONAL P0-
LICING IMPROVEMENT AGENCY, NATIONAL DNA DATABASE ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://www.npia.police.uk/en/14395.htm.
50. Legislation is presently pending in the Netherlands to allow familial searches, and Spain
and Western Australia are also investigating the practice. GENETIC SUSPEcrs: GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE OF FORENSIC DNA PROFILING AND DATABASING 177 (Richard Hindmarsh & Barbara
Prainsack, eds. 2010).
51. Amelia Belalmy-Royds & Sonya Norris, New Frontiers in Forensic DNA Analysis: Im-
plications for Canada's National DNA Data Bank, at 10, Parliamentary Information and Research
Service (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0829-e.pdf;
see also Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2008-2009 Annual Report, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.cal
dnaac-adncc/annurp/2008-2009-annurp-eng.htm#kinship.
Relative Doubt 301December 20 10]
Michigan Law Review
familial searching occurred in a particularly spectacular case, in which Brit-
ish investigators identified a youth who threw a brick off of an overpass,
causing a driver to die of a heart attack, through the databased profile of his
brother.52
The picture of familial searching in the United States is considerably
murkier, both formally and informally. But thanks to a comprehensive study
in late 2009 by Natalie Ram, some clarity is possible." At the time of her
analysis, fifteen states expressly permitted the reporting of partial matches;
California and Nebraska also expressly authorized familial searches. Six
states prohibited familial searching, but were unclear about whether partial
matches may be reported." Eleven states seemed to prohibit both partial
match reporting and intentional familial searching. Finally, four states had
policies in progress," and thirteen gave no response to the survey."
Significantly, of all those states, only two have formal, readily accessible
statements of their rules. California has a written and publicly available pol-
icy drafted by the attorney general (which explicitly outlines procedures for
intentional familial searching)." Maryland has a state statute forbidding fa-
milial searching.6 Of the remaining states, thirteen have spelled out their
61
policies in internal lab manuals, and twelve proceed only on internal prac-
tice without a written policy.6 Thus, formal law provides very little
guidance. Instead, many jurisdictions appear to follow a flexible approach in
which investigators do not actively pursue partial matches, but may follow
up on them should an unusually close matching profile turn up-a practice
that works because the vast majority of states have DNA laws that neither
63
expressly permit nor forbid kinship searches. In the absence of clear legal
52. Surrey Police, First successful prosecution after use of pioneering DNA technique, http://
www.surrey.police.uk/media/newsjitem.asp?area=12&itemlD-4293 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
53. Ram, supra note 8.
54. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
55. Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Id.
56. Alaska, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. Id.
57. Colorado, Illinois, North Dakota, and West Virginia. Id. At the time of the survey, New
York was still reviewing the practice, but it has since announced that it will permit the reporting of
inadvertent familial matches. See Peters, supra note 7.
58. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. The District of Columbia also did not
respond. Ram, supra note 8.
59. California Policy, supra note 6.
60. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (West 2010).
61. Ram, supra note 8.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. §§ 609.117 (2009) (neither prohibiting nor providing for familial
searches). In contrast, New York grants express statutory approval to conduct partial match searches,
but until it announced an express policy in December 2009 that allowed reporting of inadvertent
matches, it did not seem to be regularly engaged in familial searches. Ram, supra note 8; see also
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standards, there can emerge totally divergent practices. For instance, in
2007, the administrator of the Massachusetts state DNA database was fired
in part for reporting four near-matches, a practice state officials claimed was
prohibited.6 Meanwhile, Denver, the home of DA Morrissey, began testing
software designed specifically for familial searches in September of 2007
with apparent political support, even absent official statutory authorization.
II. SHOULD WE ALLOW FAMILIAL SEARCHES?
Given that familial searching only began in earnest in 2002 in the United
Kingdom, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that discussion of the prac-
tice in the academic literature both as a matter of empirical inquiry and legal
study has only recently begun. A few articles examine the British experi-
ence,65 as have a series of student pieces in American legal journals. 6 The
first cornerstone treatments of the issue were two pieces published in 2006,
both of which expressed support for familial search methods, though with
reservations.6 Each generated some original empirical calculations about
the likely success of familial searches--one claiming that "kinship analyses
... could increase a 10% cold-hit rate to 14%-that is, by 40%."
More substantive legal articles addressing the American experience have
been published, including two notable contributions by Jessica Gabel and
Jules Epstein.69 Professor Gabel focuses primarily on the legal implications of
familial searching, canvassing statutory and Fourth Amendment implications
Duncan Carling, Note, Less Privacy Please, We're British: Investigating Crime with DNA in the
U.K. and the U.S., 31 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 487 (2008).
64. Jonathan Saltzman, Director of crime lab quits post, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2007, at
Al. The administrator, Robert Pino, disputed the claim that the practice was prohibited. Id.
65. See, e.g., Carole McCartney, The DNA Expansion Programme and Criminal Investiga-
tion, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMIN. 175, 181 (2006); Williams & Johnson, supra note 44, at 245-46.
66. See, e.g., Daniel J. Grimm, Note, The Demographics of Genetic Surveillance: Familial
DNA Testing and the Hispanic Community, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (2007); Lina Alexandra Ho-
gan, Note, Fourth Amendment-Guilt By Relation: If Your Brother Is Convicted of a Crime, You Too
May Do Time, 30 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 543 (2008); Kimberly A. Wah, Note, A New Investigative
Lead: Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 909 (2008);
Michael Seringhaus, The Evolution of DNA Databases: Expansion, Familial Search, and the Need
for Reform (manuscript on file with author).
67. Bieber et al., supra note 39, at 1315-16 (emphasizing the value of familial searches as an
investigative tool, but cautioning that "[e]very agency or country considering such methods should
evaluate attendant policy, ethical, and legal implications"); Greely et al., supra note 20, at 248, 255,
260 (concluding that there are no "persuasive constitutional or policy arguments for prohibiting or
greatly limiting the use of this technique as a general matter," but noting that the questions of racial
disparity might make it "wise to consider an expressly population-wide database rather than ending
up with something that, through the extension to family members, becomes a large but racially
biased database").
68. Bieber et al., supra note 39, at 1316.
69. Jules Epstein, "Genetic Surveillance" - The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Inves-
tigation, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TCH. & Pot'Y 141 (2009); Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from




of the practice.o She concludes that statutory or constitutional privacy
claims by a target are likely to be "implausib[le,]"' and that searching
would likewise "pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny as applied to both the
pivot and the target."72 Her article appears to ultimately endorse familial
71search methods, although it proposes specific guidelines to cabin their use.
Professor Epstein, in contrast, offers a full-throated defense of familial
searching, dismissing the arguments made against it as "unfortunate hyper-
bole and short-sighted." 4 His ultimate thesis is that familial searches can
help "innocents who are wrongfully accused," and thus they should be
embraced." On the way to this conclusion, however, Professor Epstein re-
sponds to criticisms that familial searching is discriminatory and disruptive
of private familial bonds.
In contrast to the articles above, and to every other substantial work on
the topic, this Article argues flatly against familial search methods. It rests
its claims on both utilitarian and deontological grounds. In short, I argue
that familial searches should be forbidden because they embody the very
presumptions that our constitutional and evidentiary rules have long en-
deavored to counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimination,
propensity, and even biological determinism. They are akin to adopting a
policy to collect and store the DNA of otherwise database-ineligible per-
sons, solely because they share a blood relation with a convicted person,
while deliberately sheltering similarly situated individuals from similar ge-
netic exposure. Such an approach is likely be an ineffective means of crime
control-particularly when weighed against the costs done to society by
such a strategy-and even if effective, contradicts the very principles of
equality and liberty that law enforcement serves to uphold and defend.
Before adumbrating these claims, it is necessary to note that this Part
explores the legitimacy of familial search practices from a position that as-
sumes that, in essence, familial searches work. That is, it assumes that near-
miss searches, as a basic scientific and statistical matter, point directly
enough toward potential perpetrators to be useful at some level while
acknowledging that they also generate a limited number of false leads.
70. Gabel, supra note 69, at 26-42.
71. Id. at 31.
72. Id. at 37 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment is triggered first by the request to re-
lease the database lead's name, that such a request should require probable cause, and that
compelling a sample from a potential source requires corroborating evidence beyond the DNA
alone). My own views on the Fourth Amendment issue are expressed in Section U.B.
73. Id. at 42-57.
74. Epstein, supra note 69, at 142.
75. Id. at 142-43.
76. Id. at 162-64 (responding that other methods of investigation are likewise discriminatory
and that discrimination alone is an insufficient reason to invalidate a beneficial law enforcement
technique).
77. Id. at 165 (arguing that the disruption primarily affects "the individual in the database,"
and that it will at worst be "de minimis").
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However, at the close of this Part I do raise the question of the actual effi-
71
cacy of familial searches.
A. Actual and Apparent (Non-Race-Based) Discrimination
Familial searches are, by nature, arbitrary and discriminatory searches.
There has been much debate over their disproportionate impact on minority
communities as a result of the demographics of the criminal justice system
in general, and Section I.E below addresses those concerns. But familial
searches are also discriminatory in a more fundamental way: they unjustly
distinguish between innocent persons related to convicted offenders and
innocent persons unrelated to convicted offenders.
That is, just because a search in a database returns some partial matches
does not itself make it more likely that those partial matches belong to a
relative of the crime-scene sample source. Visualize it this way: imagine
there are two databases, one composed of profiles of 10,000 convicted of-
fenders and the other composed of profiles of 10,000 random people picked
out of the phone book. A crime occurs, and a DNA sample is developed
from the scene. In searching for an exact match in each database, it is argua-
bly reasonable to expect that the convicted offender database is more likely
to return a hit than the random database, on the theory that convicted of-
fenders are more likely perpetrators of criminal offenses than those never
before convicted (not, one should note, because they are more likely to have
a particular genetic profile). We might also justify such a search by saying
that convicted offenders, by virtue of their crimes, have forfeited the privacy
to which law-abiding citizens are entitled, and thus it is legally defensible to
treat them as the "usual suspects" in conducting a database search. Indeed,
the logic behind the constitutional decisions embracing the collection and
databasing of DNA from convicted offenders rely on precisely this argu-
ment.
But what if the search returns no exact matches? In that case, there is no
reason to think that a search for partial matches will be more likely to find a
perpetrator if conducted in the convicted offender database than in the ran-
dom database. After all, the goal of the search is to find a source not
otherwise in the database-whether that source is the relative of a convicted
offender, or the relative of non-convicted persons. As a matter of biology,
there is no reason to expect that one database is more likely to have a similar
genetic profile than the other, and indeed we would expect to see an equal
number of partial matches from each database search. In other words, there
is nothing about biology-the profile itself-that makes it more likely to
match a convicted offender database than a random persons database.
This logic fails only if, for some reason, we believe that the innocent
relatives of convicted offenders are more likely themselves to have perpe-
trated a crime than the innocent relatives of unconvicted people. That is, we
would have to believe as a matter of criminology or sociology that the
78. See infra Section II.G.I.
Relative Doubt 305December 20 10]
Michigan Law Review
relatives of criminal offenders are more likely to be criminal offenders
themselves than persons without relatives that have been convicted of crime.
And indeed, that is an argument that some proponents of familial searches
have made." But as this Part explains, that argument is problematic on many
levels, and is certainly insufficiently supported by the empirical evidence to
serve as the basis for allowing this kind of suspicionless searching. It also
raises serious legal concerns, but those will be addressed in the next Part.
For instance, in one of the first articles to formally propose familial
searching, Frederick Bieber, Charles Brenner, and David Lazer wrote:
Success of kinship searching depends most saliently on a close relative of
the perpetrator actually being in the offender database. Studies clearly in-
dicate a strong probabilistic dependency between the chances of conviction
of parents and their children, as well as among siblings. Consistent with
these studies .. . 46% of jail inmates indicated that they had at least one
close relative who had been incarcerated.80
But this argument proves too much. First, even if it could be shown that
relatives of convicted offenders are more likely to themselves have been
convicted of an offense, then if anything that simply suggests that the of-
fender databases are themselves a sufficient source for finding a perpetrator.
After all, it will only be relatives of convicted offenders who have them-
selves not been convicted, or committed a database-qualifying offense, who
are burdened by familial searches. Accordingly, a study that suggests that
convicted persons are more likely to have relatives that have served time in
jail only affirms the adequacy of exact matching as an investigative tool.
The more relevant statistic would study first-time convicted offenders to
measure what percentage of them have relatives with prior database-
qualifying offenses. An even more sensitive approach would focus specifi-
cally on first-time offenders of common DNA-amenable crimes like murder,
rape, burglary, or property offenses. Alternatively, one could determine what
percentage of inmates have relatives subsequently convicted as first-time
offenders, again ideally focusing on crimes for which DNA databases are
most likely to prove useful. All of this is to say that a study that shows that
convicted persons are related to convicted persons at best suggests that DNA
databases of convicted offenders should be more than adequate to identify
the vast majority of unknown perpetrators.
Secondly, even assuming the relevance of the crime-runs-in-families ar-
gument, the empirical evidence is far from unambiguous on this issue. Even
the sources cited in support of this proposition do not make a persuasive
case for a policy grounded on a presumption of criminality among related
people. For instance, Professors Bieber, Brenner, and Lazer cite two studies:
a 2004 study in the Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatrics and a Bu-
reau of Justice statistical report. The latter source is fraught with problems,
but perhaps most importantly, this study measured the percentage of jail
79. E.g., Epstein, supra note 69, at 163-64; Bieber, supra note 39.
80. Bieber et al., supra note 39, at 1316.
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inmates with prior incarcerated family members. But jail inmates (in con-
trast to prison inmates) include both nonconvicted and convicted persons;
indeed, in the cited study, roughly 29.2% had never before been sentenced,
and almost half of those appear to be in jail awaiting adjudication of their
case.8' Moreover, a sampling of jail inmates---even convicted ones-
inevitably samples low-level offenders, since convicted serious offenders
almost always are sentenced to state or federal prisons. Thus, a better inter-
pretation of the 46% statistic is that a large fraction of a group including
those accused of crime and those convicted of low-level offenses report hav-
ing a relative who was previously incarcerated. Although even that summary
remains undeniably crude, as it would be useful to determine whether a
large fraction of the 46% belong to one population or another (that is,
whether the "accused" versus "convicted" group make up a greater share of
the 46%).
But even assuming the statistic did measure convicted persons, or espe-
cially prison inmates (i.e., those likely to be convicted of more serious
offenses), a simple report on the percentage of inmates with a relative who
had previously been incarcerated provides weak support for a policy pre-
suming that never-before-convicted relatives of incarcerated persons are
more likely to themselves have committed crime. In other words, this bare
statistic says nothing about the number of nonincarcerated persons, or even
first-time offenders, who have a relative who was previously incarcerated.
Nor does the study convey any information about the likelihood that the un-
convicted relatives of incarcerated persons will commit crimes in the future.
It may very well be that it is more common for law-abiding people to have
law-breaking relatives than for law-breaking people to have law-breaking
relatives. Indeed, the cited statistic itself--46 percent-suggests as much:
the majority of jail inmates, it seems, have no previously incarcerated rela-
tives.
The second source provides better, but hardly convincing, support: it
simply reports that antisocial behavior in one generation of parents predicts
antisocial behavior among their children as children: when those children
grow up, they are slightly more likely to become antisocial adults and those
that do are themselves likely to have children with behavioral problems.
Even still, as the authors cautioned, "the 'hidden figures'. . . need emphasis:
almost two-thirds of the antisocial [second-generation] fathers (61%) did not
have any [third generation] children displaying conduct problems." Thus,
to the extent that there exists some relationship, it hardly suggests such a
strong likelihood that all relatives of convicted persons should now be
81. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1996, at 58 tbl.4.12 (1999). The same study reported the percentage of con-
victed and unconvicted (typically awaiting trial) persons in the jails in 1996 as roughly fifty-fifty. Id.
at 23 tbl.2.6.
82. Carolyn A. Smith & David P. Farrington, Continuities in antisocial behavior and parent-
ing across three generations, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 230, 239 (2004). ("It thus
appears that adult antisocial behavior in one or other G2 parent, rather than their childhood history
of antisocial behavior, is linked to conduct problems in their G3 children.").
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treated as presumptive suspects. Moreover, the authors are careful to note
that the findings are limited both by their "reliance on official records of
arrests or convictions" (thus leaving open the possibility that it is the famil-
ial association that directly influences the likelihood of arrest and
prosecution, rather than the risk of criminality), and also by the "inevitable
design and measurement limitations" of such a complex task.4
Moreover, logic alone suggests that any criminality is not a good proxy
for all criminality. Most people intuitively believe that there are material
differences among kinds of crimes-consider an executive convicted for
driving under the influence, a poor woman convicted for welfare or check
fraud, a securities broker convicted of insider trading, a man convicted of
incest, a college student convicted of simple assault, and a drug dealer con-
victed of murder. To the extent that "crime runs in families" might have
some empirical basis, then, it might first be important to determine what
kind of "crime" we are talking about.
In sum, there is simply no empirically defensible reason to make sus-
pects out of the innocent relatives of convicted offenders, while ignoring the
innocent relatives of nonconvicted persons. It is largely only the coincidence
of biology, or a misfortune of relation, that distinguishes the two groups-
not some greater inherent criminality. Moreover, to the extent that this
arbitrary and discriminatory use of DNA databases is justified on the "best
available option" excuse-that convicted offender databases, while artifi-
cially narrowing the suspect pool, nonetheless are the only possible option
out there-then it is critical to note the obvious alternative. If society's
commitment to DNA searches of innocent persons is so strong that such
searches are perceived to be beneficial despite the attendant concerns, then
the equitable and optimal route to harness the technology is to create a
national, universal DNA database.8 ' Then all innocent persons-not just
those with the misfortune of being related to a convicted offender-would
share equally in the burdens and benefits of DNA databases.
As a final point, it is worth refuting the argument commonly made that
partial match searches are necessary for exculpatory purposes to exonerate
suspects. One often cited case is that of Darryl Hunt, a North Carolina in-
mate convicted in 1984 on the basis of shoddy evidence. In 1994, DNA
testing on semen left by the attacker was found not to match Hunt's, but
Hunt's efforts to clear his name went ignored by prosecutors and courts. 7 It
was not until a database search ten years later found a near-match to an of-
fender whose brother was also incarcerated, and who later proved to match
the sample, that Hunt was released. But such a story is hardly a ringing
83. Id. at 231.
84. Id. at 230.
85. See infra Section H.G.2.




endorsement of familial search methods; indeed, the perversity of the case is
not just that Daryl Hunt was wrongly incarcerated, but that the state refused
to recognize his innocence despite his having proven that his DNA did not
match. An exact DNA comparison that fails to match a suspect in a case in
which an intimate sample is decisive should more than suffice to exculpate
that person. To defend familial searches as necessary for exculpation is to
effectively raise the standard for exculpation to a requirement that the
wrongly accused affirmatively prove the guilt of another person, whether
through partial match searches or any other technique. But such a move of-
fends both the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in the
criminal justice system for those pending trial, and demands too high a price
for the correction of injustice for those wrongly convicted.
B. Accuracy
Arguably the proper place to begin a critique of familial searching is
with the most central question: how well can it work? By this I do not mean,
"Does familial searching have the capacity to accurately identify the
source?"-a question to which, as stated earlier, this Part assumes the an-
swer is yes. Rather, here I mean to ask, "Do familial searches help police
investigations more than harm them?"
The introduction of any new technology creates the possibility of nega-
tive externalities. A transit system might install an electronic subway
turnstile in order to eliminate human error in toll collection, only to discover
that it loses revenue from a rise in fare jumping absent an employee's watch-
ful eye. As one cautious proponent of familial searching has observed, "It is
certainly possible that family forensic DNA, as a new technological 'toy,'
[will] be overused at first, potentially at the expense of more effective, but
less exciting, investigative techniques."'9
The use of effective familial search methods to identify crime suspects
likewise has the potential to harm, rather than aid, police investigations. The
fear is essentially twofold. First, that familial searching will cause investiga-
tors to rely on genetic leads at the expense of more traditional lines of
investigation-essentially a fear of overreliance. This is of gravest conse-
quence in cases-of which there will be many-in which the familial lead
does not pan out and no source is identified, particularly if critical investiga-
tive information is lost in the interim. But, second, genetic dependence can
also be an issue when a source is found, because in those cases the genetic
evidence may so dominate and shape the course of any subsequent investi-
gation that it inevitably taints the results.
These two fears operate insidiously together. Imagine a world-not at
all farfetched when one considers that such methods are already in devel-
opment"-in which investigators are able to instantly run crime-scene
89. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 258.
90. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 48 (describing system to do on-scene typing within an hour);
Susan A. Greenspoon et al., Micmchip Capillary Electrophoresis: Progress Toward and Integrated
Relative Doubt 309December 2010]
Michigan Law Review
samples on-site, and instantly check the results against electronic databases.
A crime occurs, and detectives immediately begin "swabbing for suspects,"
choosing to pursue genetic leads at the expense of tracking down eyewit-
nesses, since the latter is a far more laborious task with an uncertain payoff.
As a result, however, those witnesses are lost.
Even if one of the five leads pans out and the ultimate source is found,
the lost witnesses matter. The source could turn out to be a true source, but
demonstrably not the offense perpetrator (e.g., the DNA matches the worker
who was at the home installing cable), and thus the trail goes cold. Or it
could be a true source who is not a perpetrator, but who lacks a solid alibi or
clear proof of innocence. In such a case, evidence that might exculpate is
also lost, while the suspect remains clouded in suspicion. Given the ten-
dency of individuals to view new information in a manner tilted toward their
prior expectations, a psychological phenomenon known as "confirmation
bias" and well-documented with regard to forensic evidence," the risks of
wrongful accusation run high. The initial overreliance on forensic evidence
enhances the danger of confirmation bias.
The scandalous wrongful identification of Oregon attorney Brandon
Mayfield as a perpetrator of the Madrid subway bombings provides a help-
ful illustrative example. FBI authorities identified his fingerprints as a
"match" to those at the scene, and from there built a damning case against
him based on otherwise unremarkable facts, such as his conversion to Islam,
his marriage to an Egyptian immigrant, his advertisement of legal services
in a magazine owned by a suspected terrorist sympathizer, and his represen-
tation in a child custody matter of a man who later pleaded guilty to terrorist
.92conspiracy.
When Mayfield was exonerated and the "match" revealed faulty, a panel
of experts reviewing the case "cited [the analyst's] overconfidence in the
power of [the computerized database]" as having contributed to the error.
The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") conducted a separate review
and concluded that the examiner had prematurely turned to the computer
technology without completing a thorough manual inspection. The OIG
cited the analyst's bias in "reasoning 'backward'" from the print in order to
Forensic Analysis System, 10 PROFILES IN DNA 16 (2007), available at http://www.promega.coml
profiles/1002/ProfilesinDNA_1002_16.pdf; Lisa Trigg, Touch DNA forensics kits streamlining pris-
on investigations, INDIANA TRIB.-STAR (July 22, 2010) (detailing new testing kits that allow
investigators to determine who has touched an object).
91. See, e.g., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FOR-
WARD (The National Academies Press 2009); David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology,
and Other Abject Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 989 (2008)
("[A]necdotal forensics may be particularly susceptible to confirmation bias."); Paul C. Giannelli,
Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV.
163, 204 (2007).
92. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/special/s0601/final.pdf.
93. Id. at 3. But see id. at 13 (rejecting this as a cause).
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explain away discrepancies, and his overconfidence in the computerized
conclusion even in the face of contrary information.94
In a much more pedestrian case, a man who volunteered his DNA sam-
ple in a dragnet conducted to find a rapist found himself later ensnared in a
web of suspicion." Although the sample did not match in the rape case, it
was not destroyed but was instead entered into the database. A "cold hit"
linked the sample to a 1996 rape, and the man was arrested. He was eventu-
ally released when the victim came forward to exonerate him, explaining
that she and the man had engaged in consensual sex just before a stranger
had raped her." Imagine, however, if the victim had died in the attack, or
had not been able to be found ten years after the offense, or if the liaison had
been merely fleeting? Given that genetic evidence alone can serve as the
basis of conviction,97 it is easy to imagine that a grave injustice might have
occurred.
Moreover, because they return lists of leads rather than a single probable
source, familial searches increase the likelihood of confirmation bias and
equally importantly, the likelihood of distracting from the collection of more
probative or useful evidence. In other words, the availability of familial
search methods exacerbates the harms of "backward" investigation. Officers
may focus on the suspects identified genetically, as opposed to ferreting out
and following up on leads from more traditional sources. As one police offi-
cer in the United Kingdom candidly admitted, "You can slip into this lazy
approach that 'we've got DNA we needn't bother doing the rest of the
work.' "
In many cases, subsequent testing may reveal a suspected person to be in-
nocent. But in cases in which the crime-scene sample is degraded or contains
a mixture of profiles, or in which a suspect is the source but not the perpetra-
tor, the confirmatory testing may erroneously inculpate the individual. As
another commentator observed, "Police officers can rest on their laurels if
they get a forensic hit .... Anecdotally, they will put it to the offender and
hope to get an admission out of it."" Allowing DNA to "lead the way" at the
early critical stages of an investigation may result in the loss of investigative
prospects to bolster or sustain a case against the actual perpetrator, or to de-
velop exculpatory information in the event that the suspect turns out to be an
innocent source.
Apart from the consequences to individuals in particular cases, overreli-
ance on genetic evidence may also contribute to the diminution of more
94. Id. at 7, 10.
95. Advancing Justice Through the Use of Forensic DNA Technology: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 46 (2003) (testimony of Peter
J. Neufeld, Co-Director of the Innocence Project; member of New York State's Forensic Science
Review Board).
96. Id.
97. See Roth, supra note 31, at n.64.
98. McCartney, supra note 65, at 185.
99. Id. at 185.
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traditional policing skills. That is, it is not just a matter of an officer wanting
to investigate without technology, it is also an issue of her capability to do
so. Good interviewing skills, creative problem solving, and other softer
forms of investigative technique are not as easy to come by as a simple radio
call to the crime-scene technician. Without robust exercise and training,
such expertise may diminish. Scholars of policing already lament the loss of
the "beat officer" who pounded the pavement and knew the neighborhood;
now even the squad car cop could be replaced by the lab coated analyst. Yet
as one commenter observed, "[T]here is a risk that faith in forensic science
has been too easily used to shore up falling confidence in police investiga-
tive competence without questioning the fallibility and shortcomings of
applying the technique."'"
None of this is to say that traditional or conventional policing methods
are impermeable to bias, overreliance, or error. My claim is not, and could
not credibly be, that eyewitnesses or video cameras or confessions or any
other myriad evidentiary forms are inherently superior to DNA testing. But
the particular nature of DNA evidence makes it uniquely susceptible to
abuse. Unlike other forms of evidence, it is easily deployed (especially in
this dawning age of miniaturization, when rank-and-file officers will be able
to conduct instant on-scene DNA analysis of crime-scene samples). It is
also, superficially, highly convincing. Many officers and laypeople alike
think that DNA inevitably speaks the truth. As one officer remarked, "There
tends to be a reliance on forensic evidence in terms of once you have it,
other avenues aren't followed up."'0' The alluring nature of sophisticated
techniques also can inflate their true value. Whereas an officer can intui-
tively assess the utility of a witness's description of "brown hair, brown
eyes," and accordingly judge how far to push the envelope in investigating
persons matching that description, it is more difficult to weigh the signifi-
cance of a list of names churned out by a computer engaged in complex
population genetics. With familial DNA typing, the informant comes
dressed up in the omnipotent robes of technology, and so investigators that
would otherwise dismiss such a vague informant as useless may in turn find
it difficult to relegate technological "tips" to the rear reserves.
Some might argue that concerns about overreliance and confirmation
bias apply as equally to exact-match DNA searching as they do to familial
searching, and I certainly do not mean to suggest that we should wholly
discontinue the use of DNA evidence. But the risks justly assumed in
exact-match cases differs from those present in partial matching. In an
exact-match case, the probative value of DNA typing is high, in that the
person identified is almost certain to be the source. Thus, it might rea-
sonably be determined that, because an exact match points with a high
degree of confidence to the source, it is worth chancing the possibility that
the source is innocent (for whatever reason) in exchange for prompt identifi-
cation of a known probable source.
100. Id. at 189.
101. Id.
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Familial searches, in contrast, can only gesture toward possible sources.
Rather than identify one known individual that is almost certain to have
been the source of the genetic evidence, as in an exact-match case, familial
searches generate only leads, which in turn point only to a list of possible
suspects, all but one of whom definitely did not leave the evidence. As less-
reliable identifiers of suspects, familial searches can in turn affect more peo-
ple, because they cast the net indiscriminately and widely. The possibility
for intrusive investigation is enhanced, and it is more perilous to routinely
allow them to shape the course of an investigation. Familial searching is like
an occasionally reliable informant who spits out several names and says one
of them has a brother who maybe did it. It may be the case that, as in Cali-
fornia's experience thus far, in one in ten instances a name spectacularly
pans out to be correct, but that does not mean that familial searching should
be an approved law enforcement approach.
C. Privacy
Some might argue that in a case that is significant enough, and cold
enough, even the names spewed by an unreliable informant are worth pursu-
ing. But weighed against this enthusiasm should be the real costs that
familial searches exact on individual privacy. Although it is easy to mini-
mize privacy concerns, those doing so must reckon with the obvious
alternative to familial searches: a universal database. While general opposi-
tion to a universal database may be reconciled with an endorsement of
convicted offender sampling, given that offenders arguably forfeit some
right to privacy as a result of their convictions, it squarely challenges argu-
ments in favor of familial searching. If a universal database is not
considered to be politically, or legally, conceivable (which it generally is
not)'o2 then that indicates the existence of some broader discomfort with the
idea of expanding the DNA database to include innocent persons. Yet those
persons implicated by familial searches are indistinguishable from any other
individual, except for the misfortune of having a biological connection to an
offender in a DNA database.
The burden of being "findable" is not insignificant. Recall the analogy
in the previous section. Imagine the familial search that generates two leads,
each of whom has two possible candidates for suspicion (sons or brothers,
say). The most natural thing for investigators to do is simply to get a round
of DNA samples from all possible suspects, either with or without the sus-
pects' knowledge.'o3 Indeed, without legal rules to cabin the scope of an
102. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy,
and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 413, 440-41.
103. Indeed, as some advocates of familial searches have written, "[b]eing compelled to assist
in the criminal justice system, in this or any other way, may be annoying, but is common." Greely et
al., supra note 20, at 256. But as one recent case attests, the particular power of genetic evidence to
shape and influence an investigation can prove permicious. See Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104,
1107-08 (5th Cir. 2006) (addressing the § 1983 claim of man who refused to submit a DNA sample
in a six-hundred-person dragnet to catch a serial rapist-killer, gave sample pursuant to warrant found
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investigation, nothing prevents law enforcement from getting samples from
fifty or one hundred possible suspects (as investigators have done in the past
in less-targeted DNA dragnets).
Moreover, no law prevents investigators from inquiring of family or co-
workers if a suspect knew the victim or engages in certain activities (say,
frequenting prostitutes), or if the suspect cannot account for where he was
last week. No law requires that officers act quickly in testing the DNA sam-
ple voluntarily submitted for exclusion rather than allow the sample to get
lost in a year-long backlog during which the suspect's name is muddied and
tarred. And no law mandates that, once a name is formally cleared, the offi-
cer return and assure the suspect's family and coworkers that he is truly as
innocent as he was the day before the investigation began. No general law
requires that samples submitted in such an investigation be destroyed once a
suspect is ruled out, or prohibits the person's profile from being uploaded
into the national database.
The offensiveness of familial searches is not always physical in kind:
consider Richard Jewell (the wrongly identified Atlanta bomber) or Stephen
Hatfill (the wrongly identified anthrax mailer) or the members of the Duke
University lacrosse team (falsely accused of rape). The worst indignity of an
investigation can be living under a cloud of suspicion; even mere suspicion,
quickly dispelled, has the potential to disrupt a career, destroy a marriage, or
ruin a life. And to the extent that the alternative may be to let some crime go
unsolved, it should be balanced against the claim to freedom from such vic-
timization possessed by innocent relatives in equal proportion to the
innocent victims of crime. Both have moral claims to the interests of secu-
rity and liberty, whether from the perpetrators of crime or from the state
itself.
This Section considers the different constituencies affected by familial
searches of DNA databases, focusing in turn on (1) the databased person,
(2) implicated innocent relatives, and (3) the actual source.
( 1. Databased Persons
Familial searches constitute a new intrusion on the interests of databased
persons. When courts ruled on the constitutionality of collecting DNA sam-
ples from convicted offenders, they almost uniformly specified that the
information collected was "junk" that revealed no information beyond the
offender's identity As a way around the individualized suspicion, warrant,
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, courts cited the
reduced expectation of privacy of criminal offenders and the state's interest
to lack probable cause, was publicly labeled a suspect, and only learned two months later through a
television report that he was excluded as the killer).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2007); Nicholas v. Goord,
430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit observed, in upholding an offender collection
statute, that it would be possible to locate a relative, United States v. Kincade, 379 F3d 813, 818 n.7
(9th Cir. 2004), but also affirmed that the DNA profiles were to be used only for identity while
rejecting the fear that retention of samples meant they "could be mined for more private information
or otherwise misused in the future." Id. at 837-38.
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in accurate tools of identification and in monitoring recidivism. Yet familial
searches depart from all of these foundational assertions.
First, familial searches effectively transform the acquired information
from a glorified genetic social security number into a blooming family tree.
Of course, it might be argued that familial relationships are easily uncovered
without conducting scientific tests: identifying an individual certainly is the
first step in finding out the identities of that person's blood relatives. But in
many instances, identity does not in fact reveal biological ties.
In our society, families are largely social, not biological, constructs. os
Yet when investigators follow up on genetic familial searches by asking,
"Do you have any children?" or "Who is your father?", they ask a biologi-
cal, not social, question. Answering may call for the disclosure of the most
intimate of information: abandoned parental bonds, adoptee relationships,
children conceived through technology, even family secrets about paternal
identity1O A lead may feel torn between identifying relatives, potentially
exposing them to intrusive investigation, and revealing a confidence that
severs the perceived biological tie. Analysts assigning value to genetic rela-
tionships may inadvertently uncover facts that even the parties do not know.
For instance, consider an offender informed of a partial match who is asked
about and reports no known siblings or children-but later learns that the
offense was ultimately attributed to the child of his old flame, or that of his
father's long-time coworker. Biological ties can be complicated matters,
sometimes deliberately so.
Second, data suggests that a second round of typing, measuring Y-STRs
or single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), proves an essential component
of an effective DNA typing program.' 7 But judicial approval of mandatory
collection statutes specifically and clearly limited the scope of testing to the
thirteen CODIS STR loci, based on the noncoding or "junk" nature of those
loci; courts did not issue a carte blanche to retype samples any time a new
set of tests emerged. That Y-STR testing indisputably reveals biological rela-
tionships, and has been shown to have strong probative value even for
identifying possible surnames,' means the "junk" is no longer as junky as
initially contended. Exploiting earlier rulings approving DNA collection and
typing, while failing to acknowledge the privacy interest implicated by
105. Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Forensic
Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 263, 270 (2006);
Williams & Johnson, supra note 44, at 244.
106. The frequency of misattributed paternity has proven difficult to measure, but studies
suggest rates as low as I percent or as high as 30 percent in the population, though most hover in the
2-5 percent range. Bryan Sykes & Catherine Irven, Surnames and the Y Chromosome, 66 Am. J.
HUM. GENETICS 1417, 1418 (2000).
107. By way of illustration, a 15-allele autosomal match in a database the size of California's
(over one million profiles) will turn up 1,600-4,200 potential leads. Y-STR screening of those
matches, however, reduces that number to significantly fewer, on average. Murphy et al., supra note
39; see also Bieber et al., supra note 39, at 1315; Jones, supra note 48, at 24 (noting that the U.K.
relied on Y-STR typing in recent familial search case).
108. Uta-Dorothee Immel et. al., Y-chmmosomal STR haplorype analysis reveals surname-
associated strata in the East-German population, 14 EuR. J. HUM. GENETICS 577, 580 (2006).
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subsequent tests conducted on retained biological samples, simply affirms
the fear of "function creep," long lodged against the government with regard
to new technologies, and raised against DNA databases.'"
Indeed, within the past three years, the National Institute of Justice has
issued grants to projects titled "Identifying and Communicating Genetic
Determinants of Facial Features," "Determination of the physical character-
istics of an individual from biological stains," and "Gene Polymorphism and
Human Pigmentation."" Scientists increasingly search for genomic clues to
other personal characteristics, such as using DNA typing to determine an
individual's age, likely ethnicity, and even bone structure."' And research
for clues to psychological and disease predispositions is always underway.
So long as the samples are retained, they will be available for processing
using these new tests without any defined legal restrictions." 2
Yet such unfettered access to the entire genome of an individual should
not be presumed from the cases approving forensic databasing. By analogy,
if the government gained Fourth Amendment approval for a body scanner on
the grounds that it revealed only the presence of illicit narcotics, it would be
improper for officials to claim authority to use BodyScan 2.0, which also
renders a naked visual image of the person, by claiming that the general
technology had already been approved. Indeed, the former director of the
FBI's database seemed to tacitly recognize as much when he determined to
leave to legislative judgment (and presumably, to subsequent constitutional
challenge) the question whether familial searching should be allowed."3
Lastly, it should be added that the DNA databases are not entirely com-
posed of convicted offenders. Many states now include arrestee profiles, for
instance."4 Databases can also include individuals who either submitted
DNA samples voluntarily (for instance, in a DNA dragnet or to exclude
themselves in an investigation), or even as victims of crime. In one notable
case, a familial search identified a source through his sibling, a victim who
had submitted a sample in an unrelated case."' Familial search methods
109. Carling, supra note 63, at 501; Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Propo-
sition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 203
(2006) (detailing how "databases created for one discrete purpose, despite the initial promises of
their creators, eventually take on new functions and purposes" and citing the archetypal example of
social security numbers).
110. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
111. Gautam Naik, To Sketch a Thief Genes Draw Likeness of Suspects, WALL ST. J., Mar.
27, 2009, at A9. See generally Dov Fox, The Second Generation of Racial Profiling, 38 Am. J.
CRIM. L. (forthcoming Nov. 2010) (manuscript on file with author).
112. The sole restraint would be allegations of misuse, but the statutes governing misuse are
woefully inadequate. See infra note 171.
113. See Nakashima, supra note 2.
114. The legal status of arrestee collection is still uncertain in the United States, but the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has ruled that unqualified inclusion of arrestees and juveniles in the
United Kingdom's database violated international privacy protections. S. v. United Kingdom, 2008
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581, available at http://www.bailii.org/eulcases/ECHR/2008/1581.html.
115. Another court recently held the typing and database retention of a DNA profile recovered
from a victim's clothing without consent was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (but refused to
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threaten to erode the good will between such individuals-victims, volun-
tary cooperators, etc.-and the state, as those persons may fear that
cooperation with the government will expose their relatives or themselves to
later suspicion or apprehension.
2. Innocent Relatives
Even if persons in the database have forfeited their privacy interests,
they surely cannot have relinquished the interests of their father, mother,
brothers, sisters, and children. Familial searches exploit the government's
power to compel information from persons with diminished privacy (i.e.,
mandatory typing of the offender's DNA profile) to then invade the privacy
of their law-abiding relatives (by drawing inferences about the relatives'
profile). Familial searching effectively amounts to a law that says, "The
identity and probable genetic markers of the close relatives of any convicted
offender shall be entered into the national database."
In other words, familial searches take information obtained on one pre-
mise-diminished expectation of privacy and likely recidivism of
offenders-to justify two far more dubious propositions: that investigators
may justly use databases to generate suspect pools, and that any follow-up
investigation is not unconstitutionally suspicionless because some degree of
allelic similarity makes it conceivable that an individual is the source. But
relatives possess the same privacy interest as those not related to offenders,
both as a normative and descriptive matter, in not being considered suspects
solely on the basis of attenuated genetic probabilities.
Most egregiously, the potential harm to relatives exceeds that of even the
actual offenders. A twenty-six allele search tends to turn up one and only
one match, which in turn has a high probability of belonging to the true
source. Thus, any intrusions that follow, at the very least, are likely targeted
to the right person. But the inferential "profile" of relatives is necessarily
incomplete. The relative is not just in the database once with a precise pro-
file, but instead is in the database multiple times with every possible profile
permutation that completes the blanks of a partial match. If familial search-
ing is to be allowed, a relative would be wise to volunteer a genetic sample
(and thus be more readily excluded) rather than run the risk of repeated re-
quests for samples that ultimately prove not to match. But these innocent
persons should not have to make such a strategic election when they are,
like all other persons, legally entitled to the full privacy protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, because familial searches generate only possibilities, and in-
herently produce false positives, the follow-up investigation will necessarily
focus at times upon wholly innocent persons. Normally, resource constraints
and constitutional law erect barriers to investigations conducted on the basis
of tips with high false-positives in the real world. We trust as a matter of
apply the exclusionary rule in a later prosecution against the victim). United States v. Davis, 657 F.
Supp. 2d 630, 663 (D. Md. 2009).
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efficiency that law enforcement will allocate its attention and resources to
the most credible suspects, and as a matter of constitutional law that intru-
sions will not occur absent particularized suspicion. But technology upsets
those assumptions.
Consider an intrusion as inoffensive as a Terry stop, which must be
based on individualized suspicion. An officer who found drugs in an apart-
ment building foyer would hardly find it worthwhile to Terry stop every
drug dealer in sight. And if she did, the officer would have a tough time jus-
tifying those stops as a matter of law; an officer that admitted to having also
stopped all the relatives of the drug dealers would be sent back to the acad-
emy for training. Yet the same kind of indiscriminate, suspicionless
investigation is considered acceptable when cloaked in the biological terms
of familial searching.
It is worth noting that some might argue that offenders routinely disclose
the identities of their relatives for purposes of supervision and monitoring,
and thus the added biological exposure is not that great. But several impor-
tant practical limitations circumscribe the actual intrusiveness of such
information. First, just because the probation office knows the name of the
offenders' family members, it does not follow that the sheriff also does. As a
matter of institutional arrangement, law enforcement officers often interface
with probation/parole indirectly, or only through deliberate efforts. Sec-
ondly, even if such information were sought, it will inevitably reflect the
social, as opposed to biological, construction of families. That is, an of-
fender is unlikely (and in fact, may be unable) to give the name of the father
he never met, or the son he does not raise, or even the sister who refuses to
talk to him, and law enforcement will be unlikely to have special access to
that information. But the genome speaks for itself. It tells the police that the
father is not in fact the man on probation in the next county, or that the
brother is not in fact a full sibling.
Third, even if criminal justice entities can easily acquire information
about biological relatedness, their purpose in collecting that information,
and the manner in which it is used, is rarely to cast suspicion on those rela-
tives. Individuals are not typically suspected of a crime solely because of a
related offender's criminal record, and law enforcement does not typically
consider genealogy a useful approach to solving cases. Thus, as a practical
matter, the use of genetic databases to conduct familial searches takes in-
formation (the identity of relatives) otherwise collected for innocuous
reasons and transforms it into something more sinister. The purpose of ac-
quiring the information changes from offender rehabilitative (environment,
contacts) to generally investigative (maybe his brother is also a criminal).
And that purpose, it is worth reminding, is one overtly eschewed by the cas-
es upholding the constitutionality of offender DNA collection.
3. The Source
Of all the affected parties, perhaps the least sympathetic is the source.
After all, the source-the person who actually left the crime-scene sample
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identified through a familial search-may be the criminal offender. It is cer-
tainly difficult to get too exercised about the privacy rights of the actual
perpetrator.
But if it is hard to muster much empathy for the source who turns out to
have perpetrated the offense, then imagine instead the source who did not.
In many cases, a familial search may locate the source, but the source is not,
in fact, the perpetrator of the crime. At times that may be obvious. Maybe
the source has an explanation, such as innocent presence at the scene or a
rock-solid alibi-as in the case of the woman identified by DNA evidence
who later turned out to have been in jail in another state at the time of the
crime."'6 Maybe the source will be facially implausible as a perpetrator-
such as the case of the man whose DNA was found on a rape-murder victim,
but who was four years old at the time of the offense."7 But it is also possi-
ble that, in a number of cases, identification of the source may start the
investigation for corroborating evidence. And for innocent suspects without
ironclad defenses, or those against whom charges are brought decades after
the offense, that process raises the risks of overreliance and confirmation
bias discussed above."8
D. Societal Interest in Intact Families
In addition to the particular privacy interests of affected individuals,
there also exists a greater societal interest in maintaining and promoting
intact, healthy family units. Family integrity and privacy are cornerstone
constitutional values. Jurisdictions honor those interests in a variety of
ways-for example, by authorizing spousal privilege. Yet "implicating fam-
ily members in an investigation where a relative (genetic or social) might be
involved is likely to have profound social, cultural and physical impacts on
that family.""'9 Of course, in cases in which the lead turns out to point to the
source, and the source is in fact the perpetrator, our sympathies may be hard
won. But the nature of familial searching means that many potential leads
will prove to be false leads-after some investigation has occurred. And the
investigation alone has the capacity to deepen painful rifts within strained
familial relationships.
Family members may have already suffered greatly as a result of the ac-
tions of a related convicted offender. They may have incurred financial
losses due to legal costs or thefts, and have endured emotional harms from
incarceration, abandonment, or betrayal. Perhaps members of the family
themselves were victims of the offender-in 2005, for instance, roughly half
of violent crimes occurred between nonstrangers, and roughly 26 percent of
116. Murphy, supra note 22, at 754 n.149.
117. Id.at755n.151.
118. See supra Section II.B.
119. Haimes, supra note 105, at 269.
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female victims were victimized by someone intimate or related to them.120 In
such cases, the suspicion cast on the relative as a result of the estranged of-
fender can be especially painful. Imagine the child of a sex offender
confronted with a knock on the door because the DNA of the father he has
no desire ever to remember has superficially implicated him in some of-
fense. Or the successful sibling in a family torn apart by their youngest
child's drug habit similarly confronted. Criminality can tear families apart,
and when the state conducts investigations based primarily on familial links,
it does so with the strong probability of inflicting further damage.
Even in families in which the offender's position is reconciled, familial
searching may wreak havoc by turning convicted offenders into involuntary
"genetic informants.""' Consider a recent case in the United Kingdom, in
which a nineteen-year-old arrested for reckless driving was required to sub-
mit his DNA profile.122 When a familial search was later run to find the
perpetrator of rape and murder committed twenty-five years earlier (and
thus clearly not committed by him), his Y chromosome matched. Investiga-
tors arrested his father and two uncles, and later testing revealed his father to
be the perpetrator.123
Although such stories are powerful in that they represent the closing of
long-unsolved cases, it is worth considering the harm done to the family unit
if such investigations become routine. While little sympathy might rest with
the father, perhaps greater concern might be mustered for the nineteen-year-
old, who through one youthful indiscretion caused horrifying embarrass-
ment and suspicion to be cast on his uncles. Such searches burden the
relationship between innocent relatives and the convicted offender, as
relatives find themselves suspected of a crime they did not commit by virtue
of nothing other than their biological connection. Indeed, such strain can
occur even absent an actual match: the mere awareness by Good Sibling that
Bad Sibling's conviction now leaves her susceptible to this kind of intrusion
may itself generate tension. And, of course, in many cases, the story will not
end with a conviction-the familial search will prove fruitless. To the extent
that the burden might nonetheless be tolerable if there were a very high rate
of success in familial matching, the price seems higher if the vast majority
of such leads fail to pan out.
Lastly, it is worth noting that even in cases in which the database lead
does uncover the actual perpetrator, it may still be at the expense of innocent
familial victims. For instance, take the first successful familial search in the
United Kingdom, that of the Joseph Kappen, described in Section I.C. Kap-
pen's crime had occurred thirty years earlier, and Kappen himself was dead,
but a familial search in the database turned up his son as a potential biologi-
120. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,
2005, at 9, tbl.9 (2006).
121. Haimes, supra note 105, at 269.




cal link. When investigators realized that the son's father, Kappen, had been
on the original list of five hundred suspects, investigators asked his widow
and siblings for DNA samples. Based on that testing, they then received
permission to exhume the body, and found a match.
On the one hand, this story represents a powerful account of persistent
investigation that undoubtedly provided a great sense of achievement for
law enforcement and peace and closure for the victims' families. But were
those families the only conceivable victims of Kappen? What about his wi-
dow or children? What if the search had not worked, and after tracking
down Kappen's family, informing them of their suspicions, eliciting samples
and exhuming the body, the father had turned out not in fact to be the
source? Or what if the genetic link was a match and the murder was attrib-
uted to him, but lost in time and human mortality was an innocent
explanation for the connection or an ironclad defense to the charge that his
wife would never learn?
Perhaps most radically, even assuming that Kappen was the true perpe-
trator, what about his family members' own experiences of the
investigation? Perhaps they were utterly unaware that their husband and fa-
ther had committed such a horrible offense. If so, then his children and
widow are victims of his crimes certainly as deserving of sympathy as those
whom he more directly harmed. Law embodies rules of finality precisely in
deference to this principle-that in some cases, it is best to let sleeping (or
dead) dogs lie. This is not to trivialize the victim's interest in finality and
closure, but merely to acknowledge that it can come at the expense of in-
flicting trauma on other innocents. At the very least, the interests of the
innocent family members might enter into the calculus for consideration,
even if they do not necessarily prevail.
E. Actual and Apparent Ethnic and Racial Discrimination
The concerns related to race and ethnicity are manifold, but I will
focus on three here. First, familial searches of convicted offender and ar-
restee databases exacerbate the actual and apparent disparities of the
criminal justice system, in which people of color are disproportionately
represented. Second, the dependence on racial categorization in interpret-
ing DNA typing results transmits a biological determinism about race that
is not supported by science and that risks formally inscribing within the
justice system inaccurate biases under the legitimizing mantel of scientific
truth. And lastly, this widespread acceptance of racial and ethnic categori-
zation as a means of quantifying DNA results (say, allelic frequencies)
opens the door to a kind of twenty-first century racial eugenics in which
crime and criminology are viewed largely as functions of genetics and
biology. I will address each of these critiques in turn.
The most vocal opposition to familial searches tends to come from those
who fear that they will exacerbate existing racial disparities in the criminal
justice system. As Jennifer Mnookin eloquently observed in an op-ed
against familial searches, such searches are already "discriminatory" in that
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they condition criminal suspicion on nothing more than the "bad luck [of
having] a close relative who has been convicted." This effect is "exacer-
bated" among certain ethnic populations, "because African Americans and
Latinos make up an outsized portion of the DNA database compared with
their proportion in the population at large." 1 Even advocates of familial
searching have acknowledged that "[fjamilial searching potentially ampli-
fies ... existing disparities" in the criminal justice system. Professors
David Kaye and Michael Smith have noted that "on any given day, a black
American is five times more likely to be in jail than is a white" and that an
adult black male is "four times more likely to be under some form of correc-
tional supervision, six-and-a-half times more likely to be incarcerated
somewhere, and eight times more likely to be in prison than his white coun-
terpart."l26 While this imbalance is somewhat lessened if misdemeanants and
arrestees are included, there still exist stark disparities. Data also shows
that the rate of incarceration for Hispanic males, while less than that of
black males, is nonetheless almost three times that of white males.128
Given the disproportionate representation of blacks and Hispanics in the
criminal justice system, the use of convicted offender databases to conduct
familial searches necessarily means that the burden of such search tech-
niques will primarily be borne by innocent relatives of those subpopulations.
Quantifying the exact impact on those groups is inherently imprecise and
difficult.129 Most commonly cited is a figure arrived at by combining the
ethnic makeup of the databases with assumptions regarding family structure,
and concludes that "more than four times as much of the African-American
population as the U.S. Caucasian population would be 'under surveil-
lance.',,O
My own research, with Dr. Montgomery Slatkin and Dr. Yun Song,
slightly complicates this picture. Our modeling of the impact of the Califor-
nia familial search policy, for instance, yielded more sensitive data. We
conclude that in California, on average, familial searches in convicted of-
fender databases most dramatically increase suspicion on Hispanic and
124. Jennifer Mnookin, The perils of expanding DNA searches to relatives, UCLA TODAY,
May 8, 2007, http://www.today.ucla.edulportallut/070508-dna-perils.aspx; see also Greely et al.,
supra note 20, at 259-60 (expressing reservations about widescale familial searching on the basis
of concerns about racial discrimination). Professor Troy Duster has contextualized various DNA
policies within the larger context of systematic biases in the criminal justice system. Troy Duster,
DNA Dragnets and Race: Larger Social Context, History, and Future, 21 GENEWATCH, Nov.-Dec.
2008, at 3, 3-5.
125. Bieber et al., supra note 39, at 1316.
126. Kaye & Smith, supra note 102, at 453 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 454-55 (noting reduction from four times to two times if arrestees are included).
128. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVA-
LENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf.
129. For example, one student note argued that the impact was likely to be greatest for His-
panics, citing larger family structures. Grimm, supra note 66.
130. See Greely et al., supra note 20, at 259.
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African American populations and away from Asian American popula-
tions. "' The reason relates to the use of the Y haplotype (the genetic profile
found on the Y chromosome), which modeling proves to be a crucial com-
ponent of search policies in order to narrow the number of leads to a
manageable number. As it turns out, the Y haplotype in Asian and Hispanic
populations is not terribly discriminating, whereas it is extremely powerful
in the African American population, and moderately so for Caucasians.
Thus, Hispanic profiles, already overrepresented in the database, are weakly
affected by the Y-STR typing stage of familial searches. Asian Americans,
although also weakly culled through Y-STR typing, conversely benefit from
their dramatic underrepresentation in databases. African Americans, mean-
while, are overrepresented in the database, but benefit from a powerfully
discerning Y-haplotype. In short, the reliance on racially disproportionate
databases will on average impact the targeting of suspicion, drawing dispro-
portionate attention toward Hispanics and African Americans and against
Asian Americans, and weakly affecting Caucasians.
Second, even if searches never generated any actual discrimination, the
mere reliance on offender databases raises an appearance of bias that the
criminal justice system can little tolerate. Criticism of the system and its
inequities has already deeply divided communities and undermined trust in
and cooperation with law enforcement actors. Using offender databases to
find relatives sends a message that in cases where there is no evidence of the
perpetrator's identity or ethnicity, it is fair to focus suspicion on not just the
usual suspects, but also the innocent relatives of the usual suspects. It is mis-
leading for advocates of familial searches to repeatedly suggest that the
technique is no more pernicious than looking in a DMV database for a
match to a partial license plate. 132 Such an analogy is inaccurate: a search in
a DMV database is a search of the entire universe of possible suspects-the
DMV database is a registry of all license plates. Instead, a familial search is
like looking for partial matches to a license plate, but in a DMV database
that contains only cars registered to those with surnames starting with M
through Z.
The sense that the eyes of justice are not blind is further exacerbated by
the starkly racial and ethnic terms in which DNA probabilities are recited.
Current CODIS protocols organize population frequencies among racial and
ethnic categories. And it is true that, as a matter of probabilities, there are
correlations among allelic frequencies within those categories that are dis-
tinguishable across generalized groups. However, the degree to which racial
categorizations become the lingua franca of DNA statistics suggests a mis-
leading amount of certainty in the connections that can be drawn between
race (largely a societal construct) and biology (a more subtle genetic phe-
nomenon that at best captures generalized notions of ancestry). As Jonathan
Kahn has eloquently observed, when compared to the meticulousness with
which research into the technical aspects of DNA typing was conducted:
131. Murphy et al., supra note 39.
132. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: A Not So Perfect Match (CBS television broadcast Mar. 23, 2007).
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The contrasting lack of care taken in characterizing the racial identity of
the genetic samples indicates an implicit assumption that such characteri-
zations are obvious, uncomplicated, and take no special expertise. This
contrast may be understood more broadly as reflecting a conceptual sepa-
ration of the world of the "social" from that of the "natural," where the
former is understood to contain transparent categories accessible to all,
while the latter requires specialized knowledge and expertise for proper
analysis and interpretation. In other words, race is seen as easy and obvi-
ous; DNA is seen as difficult and complex.'
Indeed, on a superficial level, it ought to strike most persons as odd that
the groupings are both racially and ethnically composed: distinct categories
for "Hispanic" and "African American" make little sense when there are
Hispanic persons of African, European, Asian, and Indigenous descent. Sci-
entists simply adopted the categories used to report DNA frequency
statistics from those used by the U.S. Census Bureau, despite that they are
avowedly "social in character, not biological or genetic."4 They also de-
pend on self-identification, and entirely ignore bi- and mixed-race persons.
Think of the United States' first "black" or "African American" president,
Barack Obama, who identifies culturally as African American but who by
ancestry is no more black than he is white, and who has written eloquently
about his own complex heritage. Racial and ethnic categorizations are sim-
ply that: loose and largely social associations based on the self-
identification--or the physical appearance-of a suspect.
Even if asserting actual racial identity were straightforward, it still
would not definitively dictate a particular genetic profile, since genetics at
best offer probabilities and likelihoods. In fact, the statistics used to com-
pute allelic frequencies depend on the very existence of a degree of
heterogeneity in the reproductive profiles of the population at large.
Endorsing an investigative method that quantifies findings in starkly racial
terms conveys a sense of biological certainty that science cannot support.
Such assumptions are particularly troubling given that familial searches in-
herently arise in cases with little to no other evidence about a perpetrator.
Thus, investigators might mistakenly assume, based on nothing more than
general population frequencies, that a perpetrator belongs to one group over
another, and focus their attentions accordingly.
Lastly, even assuming the utility of racial categorizations in interpreting
DNA results, it could be argued that overtly racializing biological evidence
in the criminal justice system risks embarking on a dangerous path that bi-
133. Jonathan Kahn, Race, Genes, and Justice: A Call to Reform the Presentation of Forensic
DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 325, 348 (2009).
134. Id. at 350. As one sociologist asserts, "On one hand ... scientists routinely use racial
categories in their research .... On the other hand, many scientists feel that racial classifications are
meaningless and unscientific." Id. (quoting Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilem-
mas of Classification, 15 LAW & INEQ. 7, 7 (1997)).
135. See Bruce Budowle et al., CODIS STR Loci Data from 41 Sample Populations, 46 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 453, 453-89 (2001) (finding major populations in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium).
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ologizes and pathologizes crime along racial grounds.'16 Such language may
simply bolster criminogenic views of racial or familial associations. Of
course, advocates of familial search policies might argue that, to the extent
that some racially discriminatory effects may occur as a result of familial
searches, they are offset either by the benefits of the searches themselves or
by the fact that studies that show a "strong probabilistic dependency be-
tween the chances of conviction of parents and their children, as well as
among siblings." 37
Yet it is one thing to acknowledge the reality of such dependencies along
with an appreciation of the "complex roles of genetics, environment, and
society in criminal behavior,"18 and quite another to capitalize upon it for-
mally as a means of setting investigative priorities. Drawing suspects from a
tainted pool ought not to be excused simply because there is no cleaner wa-
ter. It is easy to fall into a familiar pattern of racial stereotyping without
asking more difficult and nuanced questions about the social construction of
crime, or conversely the distribution of privileges, along racial lines. Fes-
tooning racial assumptions in technological flourishes particularly distracts
from such inquiries: a police department would readily draw criticism if it
announced a policy of focusing primary attention in all cold cases on inno-
cent minority young males, simply because statistically their rate of
offending is disproportionately highest. An equivalent policy, imposed on
genetic grounds, should escape no lesser opprobrium.
F. Preserving Democratic Accountability over the
Proper Scope of Databases
Closely related to individual liberty concerns of those persons affected
by familial searches are democratic accountability concerns about the qual-
ity of the public debate concerning the scope of the databases. DNA
databases are, for the most part, creatures of legislative enactment. The fed-
eral government and each of the fifty states have laws that set out exactly
who should be required to submit genetic material for testing. The courts
continue to confront challenges raised by those mandated by statute to con-
tribute DNA samples, and consensus is lacking around certain practices like
arrestee sampling. Yet familial searching easily skirts such challenges by
effectively adding relatives to the database not through statutory mandate,
but through search technique.
The importance of regulating databases more transparently is under-
scored by the apparent pervasive and profound resistance to universal
136. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1943
(1993) (discussing the racial construction of crime).
137. Bieber et al., supra note 39, at 1316.
138. Id.
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databases.'" Professors Kaye and Smith sounded the first call for a popula-
tion-wide database in 2003, when they argued:
[S]ettling for a DNA identification database restricted to convicts, or to
convicts and arrestees, is sure to aggravate racial polarization in society,
undermine the legitimacy of law and law enforcement, and further
compromise public safety by halting far short of the deterrent and
investigative capability that a population-wide database would afford'
At the same time, however, they acknowledged that public opposition to
mandatory DNA collection would be strong. Indeed, this sentiment has en-
dured despite the steady expansion of DNA collection over the past few
years from serious felons to all felons to misdemeanants and now to arrest-
ees.
Familial searching widens the net once more. As the American Society
of Law, Medicine, and Ethics wrote in a report it prepared on the issue,
"[f]ow stringency searches are an implicit database expansion that should be
open to public debate." 4 1 Familial search policies represent an end run
around database inclusion statutes in several ways: they widen the size of
databases by effectively including relatives within them; they widen the
types of testing conducted on DNA samples by undertaking additional forms
of genetic typing; and they widen the scope of information exposed by the
"junk" DNA the government collects. Yet all of these expansions occur in
the shadow, rather than the glare, of the public eye.
As regards the size of the database, familial searches effectively add the
profiles of relatives to the database, even though they are not eligible for
inclusion according to the established legal criteria. At the same time that
social and legal debates swirl around whether persons arrested only on
probable cause should be required to submit genetic samples, relatives find
themselves eligible for the database based on nothing more than their rela-
tionship to a convicted offender. This sub rosa addition of the relatives'
profiles is particularly offensive in that, by virtue of being an incomplete or
partial addition, the relatives receive less protection than the offenders re-
quired by law to contribute samples. That is, because the actual profile is
not in the database, the relatives may in fact find themselves more likely to
be erroneously suspected as the source of a crime-scene sample than if they
voluntarily submitted their full forensic profile. As previously noted, many
relatives might even feel it preferable, as a choice of lesser evils, to voluntar-
ily submit their genetic information rather than run the risk of later
confrontation.
Similarly, familial searches represent a widening in the types of testing
and scope of information that DNA collection and typing reveals. The con-
139. The letters in response to a recent op-ed suggesting a universal database provide anecdo-
tal support for this observation. See Letters to the Editor, N.Y TImES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A16,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/opinion/120dna.html.
140. Kaye & Smith, supra note 102, at 459.
141. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 255.
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stitutional challenges to DNA collection hinge in large part on the under-
standing that the typed DNA transmits no substantive information-that
they were, in essence, "junk" identifiers.142 But as explained earlier,43 partial
matches using only the thirteen approved CODIS loci prove insufficiently
discriminating to be useful; it is necessary to conduct additional forms of
testing to narrow the pool to a manageable number. Moreover, the exploita-
tion of typed samples to make inferences about the genetic profile of family
members of convicted offenders constitutes a shift in the purpose and scope
of DNA databases.
Of course, this Article argues that the Constitution ought to prohibit fa-
milial searching altogether;'" if, for instance, the law prevents those arrested
on probable cause from inclusion in the database, it should certainly protect
those on whom no suspicion has fallen at all. But at the very least, the de-
termination to effectively include relatives in the DNA database should be a
resolved by open democratic debate, not closed-door laboratory discretion.
Even assuming that the practice could in some instances be constitu-
tional, the current lack of legislative discussion is nonetheless troubling. A
wide variation exists in the technical parameters applied to searches to
minimize false leads, the contexts in which familial searches occur, and the
nature of the investigation permitted in following up on a match. The Colo-
rado district attorney, for example, garnered his first conviction from a
familial search in a case involving car thefts, indicating that some jurisdic-
tions engage the technique in even relatively low-level property offenses.145
As Part IV explores in detail, there are an array of restrictions and other
safeguards that might be imposed to limit the scope and intrusiveness of
searches and the ensuing investigations. If familial searching is to be author-
ized, then, the precise scope and contours of the practice is a subject worthy
of public discussion and debate.
G. Conclusion
The foregoing Part raises a series of objections to the practice of familial
searching. Some of those objections are principled complaints that no
amount of programmatic tailoring can remedy. For instance, even the most
carefully crafted familial search policy cannot overcome concerns that fa-
milial searching arbitrarily creates suspect pools, reinforces ideas of
biological determinism, or undermines the state's interest in promoting in-
tact families. Other objections, in contrast, might be ameliorated through
careful implementation of the practice-for instance, concerns about con-
firmation bias or privacy.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 104-109.
143. Id.
144. See infra Part II.
145. Greg Griffin, Familial DNA software may catch on in catching criminals, DENVER POST
(November 17, 2009), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci-13804045.
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Both kinds of objections, however, inevitably gesture toward two re-
sponses. First, it might be argued that even principled arguments against
familial searching could be overcome if its efficacy reached such a high
threshold that, in essence, the trade-offs were worth it. And second, it might
be argued that the obvious alternative to engaging in familial searching
would be, as noted above, the creation of a universal (or population-wide)
database. Before proceeding to the next Part, I will address each of these
points in turn.
1. A Word About Actual Efficacy
Although this Part proceeded on the assumption that familial searching
can work, it is worth spending a moment considering how often or how well
it works. Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive studies of familial
search methods from the field. The information that exists instead derives
from two sources: anecdotal reports and scientific modeling. Anecdotal re-
ports are difficult to judge: although there have been numerous newspaper
reports of isolated successes with familial searching, it seems plausible that
the sensational nature of such matches might mean that those stories are not
the tip of the iceberg, but its entirety. Moreover, an equal number of sensa-
tional stories revealing laboratory corruption or malfeasance or even honest
mistakes that result in erroneous arrest, prosecution, or conviction on the
basis of DNA evidence weighs against viewing any anecdotal evidence as
itself determinative.'
Notwithstanding the mixed anecdotal reports, it is interesting to observe
that in both the United States and the United Kingdom, even those jurisdic-
tions with aggressive policies seem to report only moderate actual success.
Although by no means scientific, it is perhaps illustrative that one of the
most vocal proponents of familial DNA searching, Denver DA Mitch Mor-
rissey, maintains an online list of successful identification of suspects using
the technique-culled from around the world-and it is currently only up to
thirty-one.147 When California was in the process of deciding whether to
allow partial matches, a top legal advisor in the state's DNA unit cautioned
that at least the FBI's version of partial match searching was likely to result
in many "dead-end lead[s]," and it seems that so far one in ten searches has
proved successful. 14 Simulated models likewise demonstrate that it is in fact
quite difficult to strike a functional balance between setting partial match
thresholds low enough to ensnare a good lead and high enough to ensure
146. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 22, at 752.
147. Denver District Attorney, Familial DNA Database Searches, http://www.denverda.org/
DNA/FamiiialDNADatabaseSearches.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). Of course, as observed
earlier, the three family search leads that caused DA Morrissey to encourage a change in the FBI
rule change did not pan out. An additional twenty cases did not involve familial searching, but none-
theless involved an aspect related to partial matches. Id.
148. Memorandum from Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Attorney General, DNA Legal Unit,
to Attorney General Brown, California Department of Justice, DNA Data Bank Program: Reporting
"Partial Matches" to Law Enforcement 3 (June 6, 2007); see also Miller, supra note 10.
that a manageable number of overall leads are returned.'49 An indication that
familial search methods yield limited positive results, when weighed against
the series of concerns enumerated above, may thus tip the balance away
from their continued use.
2. A Word About Universal Databases
The second response to the preceding arguments might be to concede
the myriad inequities and pitfalls of familial searching, and to instead argue
in favor of a population-wide DNA database. Of course, the primary obsta-
cle to such an approach would be the Constitution-in a constitutional
regime that struggles with whether to allow the state to demand a person's
name without suspicion"o or whether to create a national identity card,"' a
program that requires the compulsory submission of a DNA sample seems
highly unlikely to withstand attack.15 2
But even assuming that such a program were to materialize, would it al-
leviate the resistance to familial searching expressed in this Part? The
response is, of course, yes. Both the principled and utilitarian objections to
familial searching would be overcome by the establishment of a universal
database that, in effect, eliminated entirely the need for familial searches at
all (since, in theory, every match could be made exactly). Such a database
might raise other, equally perplexing questions-such as the proper bounda-
ries for the exploitation of genetic information in criminal investigations or
the manner in which such tools distract from conversations about the social
construction of crime and policing (who and what society deems "crimi-
nal"). But those are objections for another paper.
That leads to the final question, which is whether a universal database
is thus desirable as a way of eliminating or ameliorating the concerns of
this Article. The response to that is more complicated. My own intuitions
are that, in light of the issues just alluded to, including my reservations
about overreliance on biological evidence in the criminal justice system, to
149. See Curran & Buckleton, supra note 49; Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable
Cause and Partial Matching, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 182, 185 (2009), http://
thepocketpart.org/2009/04/13/ram.html (noting "substantial rate of false positives" for familial
matches); Thomas M. Reid et al., Use of sibling pairs to determine the familial searching efficiency
offorensic databases, 2 FORENSIc Sc. INT'L 340, 342 (2008); Murphy et al., supra note 39, at 7.
150. See H-iibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (upholding statute
requiring disclosure of name upon reasonable suspicion); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971)
(upholding statute that requires drivers involved in accidents to stop and give name and address).
151. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW:
FEW BENEFITS, STAGGERING COSTs: ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S
NATIONAL ID PROGRAM 4-5 (May 2008) (discussing "voluntary" nature of card).
152. It seems virtually impossible that a universal database could withstand constitutional
scrutiny. The Fourth Amendment seems quite clearly, even among those who give it its least restric-
tive interpretation, to prohibit the compulsory genetic sampling, without suspicion, of all U.S.
citizens. See infra note 193. At best, such a database might be compiled through a quid pro quo-in
order to get a driver's license, for instance, a person would have to submit a DNA sample, although
even then the suspicionless use of that database for criminal justice purposes might raise constitu-
tional problems.
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implement a universal database is to take a step in the wrong direction.
DNA typing is too powerful a method of identification to scrub it from
investigations altogether, but its power also warrants great caution. I tend
to think that a narrowly composed, scrupulously maintained database, with
protections in place to prevent undue exploitation, is the most desirable
means of striking the balance between the benefits of DNA databasing and
its potential for harm. It also strikes me as the most sound approach given
the practical constraints of limited resources to construct and maintain
such databases. I would prefer a state-of-the-art database with fewer, but
better-tailored, entries over a forever-flagging, backlogged repository of
unmanageable numbers of low-level, one-time offenders.
If, however, the current trend of expansion were to continue-such that
not just certain classes of serious offenders, or even all convicted offenders,
are to be included, but also mere arrestees-then it seems to me that a
certain tipping point is reached. Once databases cease to draw meaningful
lines around their constituent populations-and I would classify inclusion of
arrestees as such, given the large number of arrests annually-then the
corresponding benefits of keeping them small fade. In the face of unmiti-
gated enthusiasm to expand DNA databases, my intuition is to favor a
population-wide register as a way of correcting for the problem of inequity,
encouraging the population to attend to oversight, and avoiding the actual
and expressive entrenchment of extant socioeconomic and racial disparities
in the criminal justice system.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The previous Part argued against familial search practices on numerous
policy grounds. As a legal matter, no court has yet ruled on the constitution-
ality of familial searching. Although a challenge to familial search methods
might be brought under a number of constitutional provisions with varying
likelihood of success,' I will focus on the most likely source: a claim raised
under the Fourth Amendment. However, it is worth noting that in some re-
spects, a plausible challenge might be raised under the Equal Protection
Clause, and so that is the argument that I will briefly first address.
153. For instance, procedural due process would require a positive entitlement of some kind,
Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989), and even so might not "require the
opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme," United States v.
Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010 WL 3554049, at *11 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010) (quoting Conn. Dep't of
Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003)). Substantive due process privacy claims are difficult and
disfavored. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guide-
posts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."). Hank
Greely has raised the intriguing possibility of a claim based on "corruption of blood," which is pro-
hibited by the U.S. and twenty-eight state constitutions. Greely et al., supra note 20, at 257.
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A. Equal Protection
The most enticing claim under the Equal Protection Clause might at first
glance be one based upon the disparate impact upon certain racial minorities
of familial search practices. But under current doctrine, such an argument is
also the least likely to prevail: disparate impact alone does not raise a color-
able constitutional claim. Rather, the stronger argument might be one
based on the arbitrariness of a formal practice and policy that distinguishes
between relatives of convicted offenders and relatives of nonoffenders in
generating government suspicion. Of course, as such a claim does not rest
on one of the "suspect categories" such as race,'5 it would be subjected only
to rational basis review. And, of course, the rational review test is one that
is notoriously easy to meet.
However, even applying the lowest standard of review, a court might
deem irrational a formal policy that effectively divides the population into
two groups-those related to convicted offenders and those who are not-
and then treats the former population as presumptive suspects in criminal
investigations while exempting the latter population from such suspicion. It
could be deemed a form of "broad and undifferentiated disability on a
single named group"' in that it essentially diminishes the presumption
of innocence and curtails the liberty only for relatives of offenders. The
Court has also previously recognized that harms can flow from the
forced disclosure of associational ties, even outside of the genetic
154. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). A viable equal protection claim based on racial discrimination would have
to prove intentional discrimination, yet familial searching at first glance does not seem to employ
racial categories. On closer inspection, however, familial searching may involve some manner of
facial racial classification. That is, because in most cases the racial identity of the actual source is
not known, and because allelic frequencies vary among racial subgroups, investigators typically
calculate match probabilities using racial assumptions. The recommendations of the FBI Scientific
Working Group in fact encourages such an approach, noting that "[blecause we do not know the
actual ethnic composition of offender databases, we can do a pragmatic set of calculations under an
assumption that the database is 100 percent of each of the four major ethnic groups in the FBI al-
lele-frequency database." Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Ad Hoc Committee
on Partial Matches, SWGDAM Recommendations to the FBI Director on the "Interim Plan for the
Release of Information in the Event of a 'Partial Match' at NDIS", 11 FORENSIC ScI. ColMsuNs.
(Oct. 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/current/standard-guidlines/swgdam.html. The Report
then recommends that the leads be considered probative only if at least one of the four racial groups
shows a match likelihood greater than 1.0, and all groups return values greater than 0.1. Id. How-
ever, the technical intricacies of this argument might make it difficult for some courts to
comprehend.
155. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). It might be argued
that it does implicate the fundamental right to liberty and free association, or even some notion of a
fundamental right to familial privacy, in which case the practice would receive heightened scrutiny.
See e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating as irrational a policy of denying food stamps to households with unre-
lated persons); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (recognizing parental control over children's education).
156. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
157. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996).
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context, and has been particularly protective of the familial bond.'
Moreover, the Court has likewise invalidated broad, dragnet-style acqui-
sition of physical evidence." 9 Familial searching, of course, both exploits
familial connections and does so in a conjectural and speculative fash-
ion.
Of course, it might be argued that police routinely make such classifi-
cations. For instance, officers may commonly assume (absent
individualized suspicion) that a perpetrator of a crime is probably poor,
or male, or a minority. It might even be argued that such biases are to
some extent unavoidable. But it is one thing to acknowledge the com-
mon biases or predispositions of law enforcement; it is another thing
altogether to enshrine them as formal investigative protocol-to an-
nounce that the police may constitutionally first investigate all poor
people, or all men, or all minorities, regardless of any particularized rea-
son to believe the suspect matches those categories. Absent evidence or a
rational basis for believing that relatives of offenders are more likely to have
committed a crime than relatives of nonoffenders, distinguishing between
the legal protection accorded each group seems indefensible and irrational.
B. The Fourth Amendment
An attack on familial searching under the Fourth Amendment presents
difficult doctrinal challenges, although it is likely the more obvious means
of approach.'6 The first difficulty is in identifying a constitutionally cogni-
zable "search" or "seizure." A familial search is composed of a sequence of
steps-offender sample collection, sample testing, sample retention, sample
databasing, database searching, possible sample retesting, and so on.
Which of these steps invokes constitutional scrutiny?
158. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) ("[Tlhe personal affilia-
tions that exemplify [the constitutional values deserving protection] are those that attend the creation
and sustenance of a family.").
159. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (invalidating fingerprint dragnet of roughly
seventy-five black youth on the grounds that it was intrusive and insufficiently tailored). The Court
did, however, suggest that a more limited detention of persons for purposes of fingerprinting, espe-
cially if done with judicial approval, might survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 727-28.
160. It is the most natural amendment under which such a challenge would arise, however,
especially given the Supreme Court's position that "if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific
constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed
under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due
process." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (clarifying Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
161. DNA must be physically collected in a biological sample from an individual; it must then
be typed and analyzed; that entry must be uploaded into a database, with possible retention of the
physical sample; a search must be conducted of the database using a particular stringency; the
search must return a list of leads; and then that list must be winnowed down, possibly by additional
forms of testing (such as Y-STR typing).
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In the series of cases largely rejecting constitutional arguments against
mandatory collection,162 courts have not undertaken such sensitive and scru-
pulous analyses. Instead, they focus most of their attention solely on the
moment of collection and ruled it lawful.i Indeed, a plausible argument
might be made that the Constitution regulates only the moment of sample
acquisition-in this case, the lawful collection of DNA from the convicted
offender-and nothing further. In support of this argument, it would be
noted that there is some indication that it is only acquisition that triggers
constitutional scrutiny, not use. For instance, in Ferguson v. City of Charles-
ton, Justice Scalia (although writing for himself alone) suggested in a urine
drug-testing case that there was "only one act that could conceivably be re-
garded as a search. . . the taking of the urine sample."'6 1
The D.C. Circuit in Johnson v. Quander has similarly held that "access-
ing the records stored in the CODIS database is not a 'search' for Fourth
Amendment purposes. As the Supreme Court has held, the process of
matching one piece of personal information against government records
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment."'" A review of the Supreme
Court's history on the issue suggests an uncertain approach: at times the
Court has acknowledged that the act of generating and searching large,
computerized databases implicates constitutional interests, even when the
information compiled is otherwise publicly available, and at times it has
suggested the opposite.
Even the courts that have acknowledged possible constitutional claims
based on sample retention or profile databasing have not analyzed those
moments separately. For example, the First Circuit in United States v.
Weikert simply conditioned its holding on the right to undertake further
162. Compare United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010 WL 3554049 (9th Cir. Sept. 14,
2010) (analyzing arrestee sampling using totality-of-circumstances test and finding limited collec-
tion reasonable under Fourth Amendment), and Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va.
2007) (upholding state arrestee statute), with United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d. 597 (W D.
Pa. 2009) (holding federal arrestee collection statute unconstitutional), In the matter of the Welfare
of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (finding arrestee collection unconstitutional), and
Gorman v. Minnesota, 52-CV-05-684 (Minn. 5th Judicial Dist. Court. Dec. 15, 2005) (finding pre-
conviction collection of DNA a constitutional violation). The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California also recently denied a motion to enjoin the state statute providing for manda-
tory sampling of felony arrestees in California. See Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp.2d 1187 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (order denying motion for preliminary injunction on grounds that claim lacked substan-
tial likelihood of success).
163. The inadequacy of the typical approach is in part revealed by cases such as United States
v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630 (D. Ct. Md. 2009), in which the court had to conduct a detailed, sensi-
tive inquiry due to the unusual factual circumstances. There, a crime victim's clothing was collected
but not tested. It was later tested when the victim became a suspect (but then ultimately exculpated)
in another offense, and the profile was placed in the database. Later still, the profile turned up as a
database lead. Thus, disaggregating the inquiry was all but impossible to avoid.
164. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DuKE L.J. 1321, 1329-30 (2008).
165. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321 (1987)).
167. See Erin E. Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & the Future of Constitutional Criminal Pro-
cedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 810-21 (2010).
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review if the sample and profile were retained in the database after the pe-
riod of supervision ended, or should changes occur with regard to the
particular loci tested (and even developments in the known functionality of
those loci)."6 If this singular attention on acquisition continues, then consti-
tutional review of familial searching would be wholly unavailing. If the
database lead was collected lawfully, then any searches or additional testing
that followed (such as familial searches or Y-STR typing) would raise no
constitutional issues. Lawful collection simply ends the analysis: anything
further is fair play.
Moreover, even assuming that the running of a crime-scene profile in a
DNA database were to be considered a constitutional "search," then the
question remains: What constitutional interest does the lawfully databased
person, or that person's relatives, have in that search? The most direct an-
swer is to say under conventional doctrine, none. Doctrinally speaking, it is
unlikely that the search itself (or any subsequent testing) raises constitu-
tional problems. Courts upholding laws requiring a convicted person to
provide a DNA profile to law enforcement for databasing presumably un-
derstood that those profiles may and will be searched, but did not conduct
detailed analyses of the scope or manner of such searches.
In addition, standing problems might prevent any person from raising a
cognizable claim. The relatives (who suffer the harm of being "found") can-
not easily claim that the harm stemmed from a violation of their own rights,
as required by established doctrine,' because it was the lead whose genetic
information was subjected to additional search and testing. Yet the real harm
affects not the lead, but the lead's relatives, especially one identified as a
source. As regards the lead, a court might readily dismiss the additional test-
ing and searching as harmless, and characterize them simply as inferences
arrived at by investigators using lawfully obtained information that are not
regulated by the Constitution at all.
So as should by now be evident, familial searches fall between the
cracks of a range of uncertain constitutional doctrines with regard to even
the most preliminary question of whether the Fourth Amendment applies.
They start with the search of a lawfully compiled database, although using a
novel method, but searches are not clearly constitutional moments. They
may require Y-STR testing of retained physical samples from offenders, in
order to narrow the number of leads, but it is not clear that such additional
testing requires legal authorization. Even if the testing and searching vio-
lated a right, it is not clear it would be the relative's right (and not the
168. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13, 5-17 (1st Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010 WL 3554049, at *15 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring)
("Yet I stress that we do not purport to decide the hypothetical case in which a future litigant may
demonstrate that CODIS loci do code for RNA ... nor do we consider a case in which the nature of
the genetic information stored in the CODIS database is changed from present practice."); United
States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). Given that new loci are already under develop-
ment by the FBI, and that Y-STR typing has become common and widespread (and necessary in the
case of familial searching), such reservations seem wise.
169. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981) (noting Fourth Amendment
rights are "personal in nature"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
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original database lead's). And familial searches alone require no new sample
collection or testing from the relatives-that would only occur later, and
would in all likelihood be readily regulated by current Fourth Amendment
doctrine requiring either abandonment (as in the case of the Grim Sleeper),
consent, or some form of suspicion and maybe a warrant. In sum, as the
Ninth Circuit recently stated, "[I1t is not clear that familial comparisons
raise a constitutional privacy issue or, if they do, whose interests are vio-
lated."o
But the foregoing reasoning in the end makes little sense. Particularly
with DNA, it simply cannot be that so long as DNA samples are lawfully
collected, the government may do whatever it wants with them-ranging
from testing for particular genetic predispositions to creating elaborate
cross-referenced databases, to cloning the person into an army of warriors.
Indeed, in a variety of drug-testing cases, a majority of the Court has en-
dorsed the notion that testing a biological sample is a "search" for
constitutional purposes, separate from the question of collection.172 And even
those courts that have focused wholly on collection of DNA, and remained
largely untroubled by the retention of physical samples, have still always
taken great pains to explain that the tests and databases are kept in such a
way as to foreclose the obtaining of sensitive or private information or to
prevent misuse that would violate the Fourth Amendment. '7 In essence,
these courts have tied the constitutionality of taking the sample to the con-
stitutionality of the manner in which the sample will be used-finding, in
other words, that collection is acceptable because the databases are secure
and the rationale for searching solid. Thus, there is some support for use
170. Pool, 2010 WL 3554049, at *6 ("It is questionable whether the rights of the perpetrator
(if ultimately identified through the use of familial comparisons) are violated.").
171. In response to the complaint, often made by courts, that scenarios of such governmental
exploitation constitute "Hollywood fantasies," United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 838 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc), three points might be made. First, there is nothing in the misuse statutes that di-
rectly prohibits such activity. The federal statute limits disclosure of information for "law
enforcement identification purposes," but nothing about "identification purposes" limits typing to
the noncoding regions of the genome. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3)(A) (2006). In fact, the attorney gen-
eral is specifically vested with the authority to perform "analysis of the deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) identification information in a bodily sample," 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b), (c), without any re-
quirement that such analysis be on the "junk" regions, and section (d) expressly allows further
research for identification purposes, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d). Second, recent grants from the National
Institute of Justice affirm law enforcement's interest in broader aspects of genetic research, such as
"Identifying and Communicating Genetic Determinants of Facial Features," "Determination of the
Physical Characteristics of an Individual from Biological Stains," and "Gene Polymorphism and
Human Pigmentation." See generally DNA.gov: Alternative Genetic Markers, DNA Initiative,
http://www.dna.gov/research/altemativemarkers/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). And third, the vast
majority of states either have no misuse statutes or else word their misuse statute almost as broadly
as the federal government. Only eight states have express prohibitions on testing offender DNA for
medical, psychological or phenotypical information. See generally id.
172. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.9 (2001); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 313 (1997); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Exec.s Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989); Nat'l. H. Treasury Emp.s Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665 (1989).
173. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837-
38.
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scrutiny and not just acquisition scrutiny-for the idea that the Constitution
has something to say about further testing, databasing, and searching of law-
fully acquired DNA profiles.
What might such scrutiny look like? In the simplest incarnation, we can
imagine a court finding that a familial search is a suspicionless search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The partial match search itself consti-
tutes the unauthorized act.'74 Its unreasonableness would hinge upon the
arbitrariness of casting suspicion on offender relatives, as well as the
impermissibility of exploiting databases compiled on the premise of less-
ened privacy of offenders to access the fully protected DNA profiles of
relatives. The interest infringed is therefore both that of the lead, whose pro-
file is actually searched, and of the relative, whose own privacy right is
violated by the search.
Alternatively, we might articulate a relatives' protectable interest in the
privacy of their half of the databased kin's genetic code. In this sense, the
relative has a protected right not to have her own genetic information ex-
posed, if you will, by the fact of her kin's conviction. Such an interest
could be likened to the joint interest held by property owners who share
common space. As the Court made clear in Georgia v. Randolph, consent
by one co-occupant cannot vitiate the constitutional interest asserted by
the other co-occupant. In that case, the Court drew a formal line between a
consenting occupant and a present but nonconsenting co-occupant.' In-
deed, to the extent that one occupant could provide consent in the absence
of the nonconsenting co-occupant, it was because the co-occupant
assumed the risk of such an eventuality upon agreeing to share the
space. Where the co-occupant was present and denying entry, however,
"the cooperative occupant's invitation adds nothing to the government's
side to counter the force of an objecting individual's claim to security
against the government's intrusion . ...
We might likewise say that the convicted offender's diminished privacy
cannot in turn diminish the privacy of his or her relatives. Unlike the occu-
pant, even, the relative never "assumed a risk"-we all well know that we
do not choose the families into which we are born. Moreover, the individual
"waiving" the privacy right of the relative is not even voluntarily waiving
that right-the offender is typically in the database by dint of a statutory
174. Such reasoning encounters difficulties with regard to inadvertent partial matches (as
opposed to intentional ones). Inadvertent partial matches might be distinguished, and permitted, as a
form of "plain view," in the sense that a lawful search for an exact match revealed a close partial
match. But given the hazards of such an approach, see infra Section IV.B, and the ease of tailoring
software and reporting requirements to conform to a constitutional standard, separate approaches for
intentional and inadvertent matching need not be necessary.
175. 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).
176. Id. at 111.
177. Id. at 115. interestingly, by way of additional comparison, the Court rejected the claim
that one occupant's consent could overcome the other's nonconsent even though the consenting
person might wish to "deflect suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a criminal." Id. at 116. The




mandate, not voluntary consent. Thus, the constitutional authority to search
for exact matches (i.e., the diminished privacy of the offender) is wholly
absent with regard to the relative (who retains full privacy entitlements).'78
In stark terms: the partial match search, and the inference drawn from
the match itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on the
legitimate expectation of privacy held by the relative in her half of the of-
fender's genetic code, and are impermissible because they do so without
individualized or particularized suspicion. The rationale justifying such war-
rantless, suspicionless searches in the case of a direct match-namely, the
diminished expectation of privacy and recidivist threat of convicted offend-
ers-is absent when it comes to relatives, who retain the full force of Fourth
Amendment protection.
One argument against this position might be to cite cases such as Sam-
son v. California, which hold that probationers and parolees can be
subjected to warrantless and suspicionless searches at any time. ' The au-
thority to search presumably applies even in the event that the parolee shares
space with another.80 However, whereas such implied consent might have
some intuitive force with regard to physical co-occupation-a voluntary and
intentional decision to expose oneself to risk by cohabitating with a pa-
rolee-surely it cannot carry the day with regard to biological association.
After all, we cannot choose the persons with whom we share our genetic
code. In some cases, the relative may have entirely disavowed the wayward
convicted offender whose profile is in the database, or not even know of his
or her identity. In light of the involuntariness and intractability of the genetic
link, then, it seems indefensible to claim a voluntary relinquishment of pri-
vacy by the relative on account of mere biology.
The Tenth Circuit, in Poolaw v. Mercantel, relied on a variation of this
argument to invalidate both a stop and a search warrant.'8 ' In that case, the
parents-in-law and sister-in-law of a murder suspect were searched and
stopped primarily because of their familial relationship to the suspect.182
Finding the police actions unconstitutional, the court cited a range of author-
ity to "discern a clear rule: A familial relationship to someone suspected of
criminal activity, without more, does not constitute probable cause to search
178. A further analogy might be drawn to Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219
(1981), 451 U.S. at 219, in which the Court noted that the Constitution may require a search warrant
to execute an arrest warrant for an individual in the home of a third party. Just as the law-abiding
individual does not forfeit personal privacy merely by associating with the potential arrestee, so too
should the law-abiding relative not be deemed to forfeit personal privacy by mere accident of bio-
logical relation.
179. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
180. See, e.g., Thornton v. Lund, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1058-59 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (re-
viewing cases and noting that prior to Randolph, many courts assumed that a co-occupant with a
parolee was subject to the same expansive search scope, whereas Randolph called that presumption
into doubt); Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006); cf Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S.
249, 251 (2007) (holding that all occupants of a stopped vehicle, not just the driver, are "seized"
under the Fourth Amendment).




or arrest."'1 Poolaw answers a slightly different question than that raised by
familial searching, because although the relatives' interests were infringed,
they were not the ones who were suspected of a crime. But its reasoning is
apt: the privacy rights of an individual cannot be diminished simply because
that person is related to a person whose own privacy rights are diminished
by dint of committing a crime. If anything, the claim to diminish the rela-
tives' rights would be stronger in a Poolaw situation-in that case, the
suspect's identity is certain, and the relatives have an established relation-
ship to the suspect. In the case of familial searching, there will be relatives
that investigation reveals have no association whatsoever with the crime or
the perpetrator; namely, the relatives of false leads that turn up in a familial
search.
Finally, we might wholly bypass this kind of sensitive analysis and sim-
ply liken familial DNA searches to unofficial, shadow databases.'M That is,
it might be (and has successfully been) argued that DNA databases are per-
missible because offenders have diminished expectations of privacy, and
therefore sampling, typing, and databasing their genetic information does
not offend the Constitution. 8 ' But allowing a familial search is like saying
that the sampling, typing, and databasing the innocent relatives of convicted
persons is acceptable. The latter "shadowbasing" is offensive in two re-
spects. First, those innocent relatives have not forfeited their interests in
privacy, and therefore should not have the privacy of their genetic identifiers
compromised. Second, the information "collected" is partly speculative;
analysts cannot say with certainty what the actual genetic profile of the rela-
tive is, but simply draw inferences based on the partial match. In this
respect, "shadowbasing" is even more intrusive than offender databasing,
which at least links an offender to one known profile.
Of course, there remains another route of analysis altogether. This Part
has argued that if the relatives have a cognizable interest, as both a matter of
standing doctrine and substantive Fourth Amendment expectation-of-privacy
tests, then familial searching (which is by nature random and suspicionless)
infringes that interest. But the mere existence of a Fourth Amendment inter-
est does not necessarily render the familial search invalid. To be sure, in all
likelihood it does: it is hard to conceive of how the courts could defend a
search that essentially creates suspects from an artificial pool compiled on
no other basis than that they, rather than the rest of the population with the
183. Id. at 730. The court cited to Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) for the principle
that "mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause," and noted that "propinquity" need not be physical or geographi-
cal, but also included kinship and relatedness. Id. at 729-30.
184. See Murphy, supra note 22, at n.76 (describing informal databases, such as those col-
lected in Excel spreadsheets or desktop programs).
185. United States v. weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Amerson, 483
F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004).
338 [Vol. 109:291
same characteristics, happen to have kin in the offender database.'86 Indeed,
the cases upholding warrantless, suspicionless searches have almost uni-
formly done so in part with reference to fact that such searches are
indiscriminate-they randomly subject every person to equal intrusion.'
But it is possible that the Supreme Court might view the intrusion as
constitutionally permissible so long as it is done according to a plan or pol-
icy that limits its intrusiveness. The Court has previously acknowledged,
especially with regard to burgeoning technologies, that although the Fourth
Amendment does not entirely forbid the search in question, its constitution-
ality hinges on the development of a regulatory superstructure. Specifically,
in Berger v. New York'" and Katz v. United States,"9 the Court held that the
Constitution does not prohibit wiretapping, but that it does require "precise
and discriminate procedures" to safeguard against abuse.'" And, despite
those who warned "that neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eaves-
dropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's
requirements,"'9 ' in fact the Court approved "Title III," Congress's compre-
hensive regulation of wiretaps.' 92 The Court has likewise allowed under the
Fourth Amendment searches conducted according to specific, tailored legis-
lative or administrative regimes.'9 Accordingly, the next Part explores the
186. Cf Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (invalidating fingerprint dragnet on the
grounds that it was intrusive and insufficiently tailored).
187. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990).
188. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
189. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
190. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60.
191. Id. at 63.
192. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. in, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522 (1996)); see also Anuj Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REv. 553, 588-89 (2007) (recounting the history of commu-
nications privacy before Olmstead, Berger, and Katz). A "super-statute" such as Title E has the
capacity not only to shape the actions that it directly regulates, but also to embody and impart fun-
damental precepts of society. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes: The New
American Constitutionalism, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 325 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006). A comprehen-
sive regulatory regime for DNA investigations might likewise help to "introduce or consolidate a
norm or principle as fundamental," and to stabilize debates that arise as a result of the rapid pace of
scientific development and inherent pressures to exploit new technologies. Id.
193. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (invalidating search under inventory excep-
tion where officer opened container despite absence of "standardized criteria or established
routine"); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (inspection program of closely regulated junk-
yard business constituted "constitutionally adequate substitute" for warrant requirement); Camara v.
Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (conditioning constitutionality of housing in-
spections on probable cause as defined by existence of legislative or administrative standards). The
terms of particular familial search policies or orders might be reviewed under conditions such as
described by Professor Paul Giannelli in his thoughtful review of the issue, namely, where "[sluch
orders satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements if they are based on a carefully
drawn statute or rule that provides certain safeguards." Paul C. Giannelli, Nontestimonial Identifica-
tion Orders For DNA Testing, 44 CRtM. L. BULL. 590, 608 (2008). Giannelli relied on statutes along
with Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) and Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003). In
Kaupp, the Court left "open the possibility that, 'under circumscribed procedures,' a court might
validly authorize a seizure on less than probable cause when the object is fingerprinting." 538 U.S.
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possible limitations that might circumscribe the intrusiveness-whether as a
matter of constitutional necessity or political choice-of familial search me-
thods.
IV. POSSIBLE PARAMETERS
Should familial searches be deemed constitutional, the arguments ad-
vanced in Part H support their close regulation. The goal is three-fold: to
minimize their intrusiveness, optimize their efficacy, and ensure their legality.
Accordingly, this Part outlines some loose contours to be addressed by a
statutory regime or administrative policy for familial searches.
A. What Legal Form Should Familial Search Guidelines Take?
Police investigative practices, especially as regards new technologies,
are often regulated in diverse and informal ways.'94 Forensic DNA methods
conform to this expectation and are governed formally by a patchwork of
law that includes the federal Constitution, federal statutes and administrative
regulations, state statutes and regulations, and local administrative poli-
cies.'95 The opening anecdote of this Article illustrates the resulting tensions:
whereas the FBI database director preferred congressional authorization to
change the information-sharing policy, the FBI director ultimately author-
ized it without formal legislative approval.
Another anecdote illustrates this point more forcefully. In April of 2007,
the administrator of the DNA database in Massachusetts, Robert Pino, was
fired for alleged misconduct.'" One of the allegations against him was that
he prepared four reports on near-match searches in violation of laboratory
regulations. However, Pino alleged that such searches were permissible,
citing in part an email from the legal counsel to the state police. 97 The state
spokesperson, in contrast, said that "the crime lab had no written policy
banning familial searching," but that "[i]t is prohibited because the policy
did not address it."'19 That such ambiguity existed around a practice that im-
at 630 n.2 (citing Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817). The concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit case approv-
ing pretrial sampling likewise cited the existence of a "programmatic" regime as critical to finding
the search constitutional. United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010 WL 3554049, at *17-18 (9th
Cir. Sept. 14, 2010) (Lucero, J., concurring).
194. Murphy, supra note 164, at 1345-46.
195. Examples include statutory provisions; the National DNA Index System Procedures
Board, which is responsible for crafting the procedures and regulations governing both the accep-
tance and search of DNA profiles in the database; scientific working groups of the FBI (such as
SWGDAM for DNA analysis methods); the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a non-
regulatory federal agency within the Department of Commerce; and FBI executive regulations.
196. Jonathan Saltzman, State Police may hunt for a suspect using kin's DNA, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al.
197. Id. Pino had also been quoted a year earlier in an article about familial searching, in
which he stated that that technique was legal, but not used, in Massachusetts. Gareth Cook, Near
match of DNA could lead police to more suspects, BoSToN GLOBE, May 12, 2006, at Al.
198. Saltzman, supra note 196.
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plicates such fundamental values underscores the need for express legisla-
tive action, as opposed to implied silences or informal policies.
However, the state's reasoning was sound. Because partial match
searches are effectively de facto expansions of the DNA database and trans-
form the storage of "junk" genetic identifiers into valuable familial
genealogical charts, they should be presumptively impermissible absent ex-
press and tailored legislative approval at both the state and federal level. The
legislative process helps offset concerns about a lack of transparency and
accountability in such searches and ensures that appropriate safeguards are
put in place to address issues related to accuracy, privacy, and ethnic dis-
crimination. Allowing executive branch officials-whether a governor,
attorney general, or state laboratory administrator-to unilaterally authorize
such a wide-sweeping and politically contentious form of searching is to
grant the executive unchecked authority to dramatically expand the size and
character of the DNA database.'99 Just as neither sound public policy nor
constitutional doctrine would permit wiretaps to be decided on an ad hoc,
informal basis-whether by an individual investigator, by a department
chair, or by an executive official-so too should it forbid the delicate ques-
tions surrounding the implementation of familial search methods to be
resolved in such an informal and opaque manner.
B. Should Diferent Standards Govern Intentional
and Fortuitous Partial Matches?
As both a practical and political matter, the distinction between inten-
tional and inadvertent partial match searches should be considered largely
artificial. Rather, the relevant question is whether or not the search returns
exact/perpetrator matches or partial/familial matches, regardless of whether
it was the analyst's subjective intention to do so. Permitting inadvertent
matches while prohibiting intentional partial matches invites strategic be-
havior, while ignoring the more pressing question of what the parameters
of partial match searches should be.
To the extent that jurisdictions should desire to draw such a distinction
(as New York recently did), however, it may benefit from considering the
literature on incidental findings in medical research-such as when a
199. Jessica Gabel, in her article on familial searching, sets forth a detailed set of proposed
guidelines that she seems to suggest serve as ethical rather than legal constraints. Gabel, supra note
69, at 53-56. These recommendations are in some respects far more detailed than those I make here,
which function more as points for debate or consideration than specific terms, but many concur with
my own, including an exhaustion requirement, destruction of samples, and so on. Id. In addition, I
make recommendations not covered in her article, while also agreeing with some recommendations
that are not made here-such as a right of access for defense testing and a cause of action for dam-
ages in event of abuse. I differ with Professor Gabel on several points. For instance, she sets a
sixteen-loci minimum and includes a battery of confirmatory processes (including kinship analysis,
direct comparison, likelihood ratios, prioritization, and Y-STR testing). Id. at 55. 1 do not ultimately
recommend one method over another. In addition, her proposal requires only "immediate" notifica-
tion upon exclusion, whereas I would specify a time frame and numerical limits for testing for
exclusion. See id. at 54.
200. See generally Ram, supra note 8.
341December 20 10]1
participant in a brain imaging study is found to have a tumor. 1 Although
that literature is far from unified in recommending an approach, it provides
a rich resource for guidance on how to construct conditions of knowledge
that help implement concerns related to privacy. As noted below in Section
IV.F, this literature also has specifically grappled with the question of inci-
dental findings of nonpaternity. 0
C. When May Familial Searches Occur?
Any authorization for familial search methods must specify when such
searches will be permitted. Part II identified five concerns raised by familial
searches, all of which are amenable to amelioration through closer regula-
tion: discrimination, accuracy, privacy, family disruption, and democratic
accountability.
The most direct way to minimize the intrusion of familial search meth-
ods is to strictly circumscribe the number of times such searches occur. This
is best effectuated by identifying the cases in which familial searches reap
the greatest social benefit in terms of need and likely effectiveness. Thus,
familial searches might be restricted to cases involving the most serious
charges-say, homicide, sexual assault, and violent robberies. Moreover,
they might be permitted only as a matter of last resort-for instance, only in
those cases in which all other leads have been pursued and no suspect has
been identified. They could be limited to cases in which the crime-scene
sample is single source, or clearly points toward one perpetrator (rather than
a mixture with several possible profiles present). And finally, they could be
allowed only in cases in which the issue of identity is dispositive or strongly
indicative of guilt.
Of course, imposing such strictures requires an oversight structure to sa-
feguard their implementation. Such oversight could be done by various
entities, most likely judicial or executive branch (either prosecutorial or po-
lice) officials. The California policy lodges its oversight responsibilities with
the attorney general, who must review all determinations to release informa-
tion where a committee cannot reach a consensus.203 However, the danger of
such an approach is that the attorney general arguably shares the same zeal
for the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" as do investigative
officers. Vesting the courts with this authority would have the salutary effect
of interposing a neutral decision maker and of deterring a high volume of
requests (arguably preventing the process from becoming a bureaucratic
rubber stamp), but it saddles already-overburdened courts with additional
responsibilities. I think the ideal arbiter would be a committee or commis-
sion charged with reviewing such requests, perhaps composed of an
201. My thanks to Glenn Cohen for this suggestion.
202. See generally Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects
Research: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 219 (2008) (noting that studies
suggest, with varying reliability, roughly a 10 percent rate of rnisattributed paternity).
203. California Policy, supra note 6.
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interdisciplinary team of scientists and statisticians, executive officers, and
prosecuting and defense attorneys. The risk, of course, would be that there
might not be sufficient volume to keep such an entity fully occupied. Never-
theless, because familial searches ought to be a last resort rather than the
first line of inquiry, they may be less time sensitive and thus monthly or in-
termittent review periods would suffice. Such a commission might also be
charged with oversight of other aspects of forensic DNA management, such
as quality assurance or protocol development, that would further occupy
their time.
D. What Should Be the Technical Parameters Delimiting
the Scope of the Search?
Perhaps the most critical aspect of a familial search policy is its techni-
cal dimensions. Scientific questions raise some of the most difficult and
dynamic issues: difficult because they hinge on empirical questions that
have not yet been fully answered, and dynamic because those answers may
change as the technology continues to evolve. Nevertheless, it is possible to
fix some parameters in light of the current state of research.
Only a handful of studies examine the relationship between search strin-
gency and likely returns, but all that do affirm the clear problems with
autosomal matching alone. A strict match requirement-say, twenty-two
of twenty-six alleles-is likely to provide more reliable leads, and fewer
leads overall, but it is also more likely not to capture a good lead that other-
wise might have been found in the database.
It is thus necessary to narrow autosomal leads in some way other than
simply setting high match thresholds. Studies have considered a variety of
approaches. Adding subsequent typing (typically Y-STR) is the most com-
mon means of winnowing the number of matches, thereby reducing the false
leads without decreasing the probability of finding a true lead to the
source.205 The main drawbacks of this approach are three-fold: first, Y-STR
typing is applicable only to investigations of male samples; second, there are
potential legal obstacles to retyping samples to generate Y-STR profiles; and
third, the additional testing may be costly or infeasible given a large number
of leads.
Another popular alternative, either alone or in combination with auto-
somal and Y-STR typing, is to use a likelihood ratio to prioritize matches. This
approach looks not just at the number of matching alleles, but also their spe-
cific character.2 That is, some alleles are more common in the population
204. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
205. Id.; Curran & Buckleton, supra note 49, at 164 ( "[The] most straightforward way that
genetics can contribute to lowering the impact on wrongly investigated families is by increasing the
power of the technique by either adding further autosomal loci or by the use of mitochondrial DNA
or the Y chromosome.").
206. See, e.g., Cowen & Thomson, supra note 20, at 643; Curran & Buckleton, supra note 49,
at 165; Reid et al., supra note 40, at 342.
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than others, and thus a fifteen allelic match of one set of alleles can be
more- or less-discriminating than a fifteen allelic match of a different con-
stellation of alleles. Investigators may even go one step further, and
calculate likelihood ratios for false matches based on specific database char-
acteristics, which may help them to judge whether a lead is more or less
likely to be false.
All of these parameters are easily implemented, and science will inevi-
tably bring still more options to refine search results. The important thing is
to recognize the value of stated procedures for minimizing false starts. The
Grim Sleeper investigation discussed in the Introduction illustrates the util-
ity of calculated efforts to reduce false leads. In that case, California law
enforcement officials used both autosomal and Y-STR matching, as well as
developed likelihood ratios, and their efforts reduced the returns to one pos-
sible lead.207 A subcommittee of the FBI's scientific working group on DNA
evidence similarly recommended that additional testing (such as Y-STR or
mitochondrial typing) be conducted "whenever possible," that allelic fre-
quency be taken into consideration, and that likelihood ratios be used to help
assess the probative value of a match.208 In sum, in order to avoid dragnets, a
familial search policy must take the quality of the match, and not just the
quantity of alleles, into consideration.
E. Which Databases May Be Searched?
Limiting the databases that may be trolled for leads offers another way
of minimizing the intrusiveness of familial searches. Recall, for instance, the
earlier example of a familial match made to the profile of a crime victim. As
the categories of samples collected expand, DNA databases include not only
genetic material from convicted offenders, but also from an assortment of
other sources. The national database is divided into indexes for convicted
offenders, forensic stains (victims and crime scene), arrestees, and missing
persons. It could be argued that limiting searches to databases of convicted
offenders-excluding arrestees, missing persons, armed services members,
voluntary contributors, and victims-for instance, minimizes the harms of
familial searching. It both reduces the sheer number of persons affected by
such searches and minimizes collateral consequences, such as victims ex-
pressing reluctance to cooperate in investigations.
But these limitations may be difficult to enforce, especially if a state or
local database is kept in a way that does not distinguish clearly among dif-
ferent populations. More importantly, there is an undoubted artifice in
permitting such searches of convicted offenders but not victims, say, when
the ultimately affected party-the lead's relatives-are equally innocent.
207. Miller, supra note 10.
208. Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Ad Hoc Committee on Partial
Matches, SWGDAM Recommendations to the FBI Director on the "Interim Plan for the Release of
Information in the Event of a 'Partial Match' at NDIS, II FORENSIC Sc. COMMUNS. (Oct. 2009),
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/current/standard-guidlines/swgdam.htm].
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Why should the brother of a convicted offender be treated any differently
than the brother of a crime victim, given that both brothers are equally inno-
cent? If the legal and moral justification for familial searching is that
maximizing information held by law enforcement (known DNA profiles)
does not impermissibly infringe on the right of law-abiding relatives of
those persons, then it should not matter whether those law-abiding relatives
were accessed via the profile of an offender, victim, military member, or
missing person. In this regard, it seems legally, logically, and morally unjus-
tified to limit the search to particular databases. Indeed, broadening the
categories of search-eligible databases may help offset some of the concerns
of discrimination. To the extent that the intrusion is ultimately on the rela-
tives, and not the database lead, then concentrating its effects on one
population (relatives of offenders) but not another (relatives of victims or
arrestees) seems indefensible.
F. What Regulation Is There of the Follow-Up
After a Potential Familial Match?
It is equally if not more important to regulate the aftermath of a famil-
ial search as it is to superintend the search itself. Current constitutional
law already addresses restraints on police investigation, whether in the
form of surveillance, interrogation, or the taking of confirmatory biologi-
cal samples. It might be easy to treat a genetic tip as the equivalent of a tip
from a human informant and discount the need for added safeguards. But
technologies challenge our intuitive reliance on the physical world to in-
hibit investigative intrusiveness, and therefore their use merits particular
attention. By analogy, it would clearly be inadequate to analyze the consti-
tutionality of the taking of a biological sample as a purely physical matter
without also recognizing the potential intrusions enabled by scientific de-
velopment-say, typing for identification versus ascertainment of physical
characteristics versus disease prediction versus personality traits versus
cloning. Likewise, a thorough analysis demands recognition of the special
risks posed by familial searches, including concerns related to equity,
overconfidence, confirmation bias, and so on.
Accordingly, the preferred approach is to circumscribe the range of
permissible investigative practices stemming from a familial search,
whether framed as a policy choice made by legislators or as a legal re-
straint imposed by the Constitution.20 Such restrictions should apply
throughout the investigative process, such that genetic testing of a relative-
suspect is the last step, rather than the first task upon uncovering a list of
potential leads. For instance, a statutory regime might require initial inves-
tigation of familial match suspects using public sources, and prohibit
209. Indeed, the two may correlate. The Supreme Court has shown deference to the legislature
in such situations, espousing a "strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress,
especially when it turns on what is 'reasonable.'" United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416
(1976).
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direct investigation or genetic sampling absent some threshold corrobora-
tive showing. A statutory regime ought also to address the confidentiality
concerns raised by familial testing, and impose ethical and legal con-
straints on an analyst's ability to disclose sensitive information-for
example, should the analyst learn that the lead's son is not in fact biologi-
210cally related to the lead at all.
Additional regulation should govern the collection, testing, and reten-
tion of samples from suspects (i.e., the leads' relatives). Statutes could
prohibit confirmatory testing unless the number of leads was narrowed to
(say) three, so as to prevent indiscriminate sampling.2"' Another possible
safeguard might include imposing a layer of oversight on collection deci-
sions, such as requiring a court order or subpoena before seeking
biological samples. A regime might prohibit surreptitious or dragnet sam-
pling. The efficacy of such rules would of course in part depend on
whether it remained permissible to collect samples that are "voluntary" 212
or "abandoned"213 or in the custody of third parties.214 Practically speaking,
an elaborate, informed consent system, perhaps modeled on research study
participant waivers, might be a preferable means of ensuring that suspects
are treated fairly.
Moreover, to prevent relatives from suffering under a cloud of suspi-
cion while caught in testing backlogs, a regime might require confirmation
or exclusion testing of relative samples to occur within a set period of
time, such as one week. Such a rule might also have the salutary collateral
effect of incentivizing the prioritization and winnowing of sample-taking
from suspects. If investigators have only a limited window in which to
conduct tests once a sample is procured, then they might be more inclined
to collect samples on a "rolling" basis rather than attempt blanket collec-
tion from all possible suspects.
Regulations should also mandate the destruction of both the genetic
profile and the physical sample after testing, assuming the suspected rela-
tive turns out not to have in fact been the source. Maintenance of such
210. Such questions arise frequently in the field of genetic testing, and that literature could
illuminate the legal discussion. See, e.g., Anneke Lucassen & Michael Parker, Revealing false pater-
nity: some ethical consideration, 357 LANCET 1033 (2001).
211. California's policy has a form of such restraint, in that it permits the release of names
only for "manageable" results. California Policy, supra note 6.
212. One jurisdiction has even begun dropping charges in exchange for a voluntary DNA
sample. Debra Cassens Weiss, Calif DA Dismisses Misdemeanor and Drug Charges in Exchange
for DNA, A.B.A. J., Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://www.abajournal.com/newslarticle/calif._da_
dismissesdrugand_misdemeanor_chargesjinexchange_for_dna/ (describing the "spit and acquit"
practice in Orange County, California).
213. Courts have approved the use of deliberate deception, such as agents posed as Taco Bell
workers or sweepstakes officials, to collect DNA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d
429 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). But see Tom Jackman, No Court Order Issued for DNA in Rape Case,
WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at B8 (reporting court's refusal to order girl to preserve tissue from
abortion in order to aid in sexual assault prosecution of her father).
214. Nakashima, supra note 2, at Al (describing the apprehension of the BTK killer through
DNA of daughter's pap smear).
346 [Vol. 109:291
Relative Doubt
genetic information, whether in the national database or in state, local, or
even "rogue" informal databases, is indefensible given that the sole basis
for suspicion arose from a probabilistic similarity that did not pan out.
Such restrictions might also encourage cooperation by suspects, who
would otherwise fear getting caught in the net of eternal genetic surveil-
lance. Return of the physical sample to the suspect, while no guarantee of
privacy, might also reassure individuals that their Fourth Amendment
rights have been honored and respected.
G. What Structural Oversight Exists?
Perhaps most importantly, concerted effort to regulate familial
searches should embed structures for general quality control and over-
sight. One great advantage of using technology, and investigative
techniques based on quantitative as opposed to qualitative information, is
that the relevant outcomes are more easily measured, monitored, and as-
sessed. By building into any statutory regime a parallel requirement of
data collection and analysis, interested parties will be able to review-and
improve upon-the efficacy of such programs over time. Section IV.C al-
ready explored the use of advisory boards to respond to developing legal,
moral, and technological issues. But measurement and assessment of fun-
damental metrics should be built into the statutory scheme itself.
For instance, "hits" could be tracked at various stages of the investiga-
tion. Analysts could record the parameters of their searches (in terms of
stringency), the number and character of profiles returned based on each
stage of technical development (autosomal matching, Y-STR testing, and
the likelihood ratio rankings). Investigators could document additional
steps taken to separate good leads from bad leads, and to narrow the pool
of leads' relatives into viable suspects. Records could reflect the number
of potential sources checked or contacted, and the results of any confirma-
tory tests. A record of arrests or convictions directly attributed to familial
search investigations would also prove immensely beneficial and mark a
significant advance in quantifying the actual rather than anecdotal utility
of this method. Moreover, with such information, investigators might learn
how to refine and narrow such searches to yield optimal results, or even
whether to discontinue (or perhaps even expand) familial searching after
weighing its liabilities and its benefits. Finally, such information would be
indispensable to courts assessing the constitutionality of various statutory
constraints.
CONCLUSION
Sophisticated technological methods of investigation call for sophisticated
means of coordination and control. Familial search methods show promise for
aiding investigations, but they also raise serious concerns of fairness, equality,
civil liberty, and governmental accountability. The criminal justice system all
too often embraces new technologies haphazardly and with blind
347December 2010]
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enthusiasm. By cataloging both the possible concerns raised by familial
search methods, arguing against the practice on a variety of grounds, and
then ultimately proposing policy limitations that might mitigate some of
those concerns, this Article aims to avoid making the same mistake in the
context of familial searching.
